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EDITOR’S NOTE

I

n this issue, the third of the year, we feature a survey of the civil cases
decided in the last term by the Supreme Court. Professor Todd Pettys, the H.
Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation at the University of Iowa

College of Law, has managed to make this review both admirably thorough and
entertaining, capturing a sense of the Court as a whole along with the variety
of views presented by the individual justices. As usual, the most colorful language comes in the dissents and concurrences, where each justice is free to
speak her or his mind. The next issue will summarize the criminal cases
decided by the Court.
Judge Wayne Gorman of the Provincial Court of Newfoundland and
Labrador offers, as usual, a look at an aspect of Canadian jurisprudence. In this
issue, he takes on the difficult and ever-evolving problem of how the legal system handles
evidence obtained by law enforcement in violation of constitutional rights. I hope that this
essay provides both a useful refresher for our
Canadian readers and, for our readers in the
United States, a fascinating and thought-provoking look at a parallel system of addressing
this important question.
The article on judicial education by William
Brunson of the National Judicial College sets
forth a number of ideas and perspectives—
gleaned from a symposium involving some of the most distinguished people
involved in such efforts—on how we can do a better job educating ourselves. I
recommend that any judges involved in such efforts keep the article at hand
and refer back to it when they next plan to make a presentation to their fellow
judges.
The article by Professor Donna Shestowsky, from my alma mater, the University of California, Davis, School of Law, focuses on an important but
neglected piece of the civil litigation process: making sure that parties are aware
of programs providing mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. I hope that her data and ideas will inspire judges to consider increasing
their efforts on both an individual and an institutional basis to make sure that
people know about this valuable alternative to trials and hearings.
Finally, we have another expertly crafted crossword from Judge Victor Fleming to give your minds a break and a few thoughts on resources to explore.
—Devin Odell
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President’s Column
Robert J. Torres, Jr.

Warmest Greetings colleagues and Court Review readers!
It is my honor to serve as president of the American Judges
Association and to infuse it with my signature energy and look
forward to an eventful year. We were certainly off to an ideal
start, with Kaua’i, Hawaii serving as the venue for our 2018
Annual Educational Conference. I am sure you all enjoyed the
action-packed schedule of events, magnificent scenery, and the
spirit of Aloha that Hawai’i and her people extended to us during our stay. We will aspire to expand the AJA fellowship and
to provide relevant learning opportunities for our members
throughout the year.
Someone once advised that the difference between a good
speaker and a poor speaker is a comfortable nap. Well, we left
no chance for a nap in Kaua’i! The annual conference featured outstanding speakers who delivered a world-class event reflective of AJA’s high
standards of excellence and commitment to judicial education
The conference theme, Ke Ala Pono – Path to
Justice, focused on delivering a program that
delved into issues affecting the delivery of justice, with applicability and interest to judges
from all spectrums. Besides Dean Erwin
Chemerinksy’s annual conference update on the
United States Supreme Court, we were privileged
to hear from the Hon. Mark E. Recktenwald,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Hawai’i, and the Hon. Randal
G. B. Valenciano, Chief Judge, Fifth Circuit Court, Kaua’i.
Faculty from the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, William S.
Richardson School of Law, covered important legal issues for
those of us living in multicultural societies. Professor Seth
Stoughton’s plenary session on police-worn body cameras
helped us to better understand the technology’s potential benefits, limitations, and policy and legal implications.
I would be remiss if I did not extend kudos to my Education co-chair, the Hon. Catherine Carlson, for her dedication, perseverance, and attention to detail in planning the
conference.
The attraction and value of attending our annual educational conferences was evidenced by the significant number of
attendees, including nearly fifty judges from the Philippine
Judges Association. I wish to thank the Court Administrator of
the Philippine Judiciary, the Hon. Jose “Midas” Marquez, for
facilitating and approving their attendance. By bringing
together judges from many different jurisdictions, we increase
the value of AJA membership by providing a vast network of
international and national judicial peers with whom we may
collaborate and form friendships for years to come.
An added benefit of the conference was a traditional-style
luau fundraiser organized by the American Judges Foundation
and led by AJF President and AJA President-elect Hon. Pete
Sferrazza. Attendees of the luau enjoyed a delicious Hawaiian

feast, which included Kalua pig wrapped in ti leaves and
cooked to perfection in an earthen imu oven. Attendees were
lulled by the soothing sounds of Hawaiian music and treated
to performances from Hawai’i, Tahiti, Samoa, and Aotearoa
(New Zealand). AJF is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity, formed to
promote judicial and civic education. The successful
fundraiser supports AJF’s important work and its continued
financial contributions to worthwhile projects.
I wish to thank the Hon. Catherine Shaffer for her leadership during that past year as AJA President. I could not take on
this monumental task of serving as your incoming president
without her assistance. My appreciation extends equally to
other AJA stalwarts — the Hon. Russel Otter, Hon. Kevin
Burke, Hon. John Conery, Hon. Mary Celeste,
Hon. Steve Leben, Hon. Elizabeth Hines, Hon.
Elliot Zide, and Hon. Yvette Alexander. Thank
you all for your insight and continued collaboration. Two rising stars, the Hon. Gayle
Williams-Byers and Hon. Veronica AliceaGalvin, also deserve much recognition and
thanks for making AJA more accessible to members via social media.
As we continue the AJA mission of Making
Better Judges®, I join the AJA Executive Committee and Board of Governors as they strive to
enhance the value of AJA membership. Together
we’ll work to advance diversity in our organization by collaborating with other national court-oriented organizations. With
this objective, the 2019 midyear conference April 11-13 in
Savannah, Georgia will include a cooperative session with the
National Judicial College on procedural fairness. Furthermore,
the 2019 annual education conference we’ve scheduled in September in Chicago at the iconic Drake Hotel will be a joint
conference with the Supreme Court of Illinois Judicial College.
The AJA has provided top-quality educational conferences,
scholarships to the National Judicial College, and other valuable benefits to its members. Membership also includes quarterly issues of Court Review. I extend sincere gratitude to our
editors, the Hon. Julie Kunce Field, Hon. Devin Odell, Hon.
David Prince, and Professor Eve Brank for their selfless dedication to ensuring the journal remains relevant for the AJA
with research-based articles, essays, book reviews, and interviews on topics relevant to judges and the judicial system.
This year, we can further raise the bar for the AJA by implementing technology to bolster membership, revitalize committees, and connect with members unable to attend the educational conferences. With a little more effort and ingenuity, we
can promote our standard of excellence and be The Voice of
the Judiciary®. I believe the best way to succeed in this world
is to act on the advice you give others. On that note, I thank
you for your confidence and invite you join our objective to
walk our AJA talk this year!
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THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN

The Admission and Exclusion
of Unconstitutionally Obtained
Evidence in Canada
Wayne K. Gorman

I

n Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018), Justice
Thomas suggested in a concurring opinion that the
“assumption that state courts must apply the federal exclusionary rule is legally dubious.” In Canada, evidence obtained
in violation of our Constitution can only be excluded if a court
concludes that its admission “would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute.” This applies in every criminal case
in Canada. This test is mandated by section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982,
which states:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances,
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.1

Freedoms as part of the Constitution of Canada on April 17th,
1982, the exclusion of evidence in criminal matters was governed in this country by the common law. The common law
was not favourable to such exclusion. With limited exceptions
(such as the confessions rule) evidence was admissible if it was
relevant. The manner in which it was obtained being generally
irrelevant. Thus, in R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that there “is no judicial discretion permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence, on the ground of
unfairness to the accused. Judicial discretion in this field is a
concept which involves great uncertainty of application. The
task of a judge in the conduct of a trial is to apply the law and
to admit all evidence that is logically probative unless it is
ruled out by some exclusionary rule. If this course is followed,
an accused person has had a fair trial” (at pages 273 to 274).
All of this changed with the inclusion of the Charter in
Canada’s constitution.
POST-CHARTER

Prior to the inclusion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and

The Supreme Court of Canada’s first fulsome consideration
of section 24(2) of the Charter commenced with Ms. Ruby
Collins being grabbed by the neck by a police officer. After
the officer did so, he noticed that Ms. Collins had something
in her hand. It turned out to be heroin. It was argued that the
actions of the police officer violated Ms. Collins’s right pursuant to section 8 of the Charter to be free from “unreasonable
search or seizure.” In the Supreme Court of Canada, the primary issue became whether the heroin was admissible at Ms.
Collins’s trial.4

Footnotes
1. Note, however, that evidence can in limited circumstances also be
excluded in Canada under section 24(1) of the Charter, which
allows a court to issue a “remedy” that the court “considers just
and appropriate.” In R. v. Bjelland, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 651, at paragraph 19, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that while the
“exclusion of evidence will normally be a remedy under s. 24(2),
it cannot be ruled out as a remedy under s. 24(1). However, such
a remedy will only be available in those cases where a less intrusive remedy cannot be fashioned to safeguard the fairness of the
trial process and the integrity of the justice system.”
2. In R. v. Mack, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada
considered the words “obtained in a manner” in section 24(2) and
held that a “causal relationship is not required to support a finding that evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the
Charter, but the nature and extent of the causal relationship
remains an important factor for the trial judge’s consideration” (at

paragraph 42).
3. For a comparison of the approaches taken by the Supreme Courts
of Canada and the Supreme Court of the United States to the
exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional infringement, see Donald Stuart, Canadian and United States Supreme
Courts: Rowing in Opposite Directions on Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence (2009), 70 C.R. (6th) 62. Interestingly,
in Director of Public Prosecutions v. J.C. [2015] IESC 31, the
Supreme Court of Ireland suggested that the United States,
“which at one stage had the most far-reaching exclusionary rule,
has long since abandoned an absolute or near absolute exclusionary rule” (at paragraph 74).
4. In an earlier case (R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613), the Supreme
Court had ruled that blood-alcohol analysis evidence was inadmissible pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter as a result of the
accused’s right to contact counsel having been infringed. However, in excluding the evidence, the Supreme Court indicated that

In this column, I intend to trace the evolution of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s consideration of this provision and
the admission and exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence in Canada.2 As will be seen, it involves the Supreme
Court of Canada issuing a reversal of a long series of judgments it had proffered in this area. But, let us start before the
Charter was enacted.3
PRE-CHARTER
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In R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, the Supreme Court of
Canada commenced its analysis of this issue by noting that the
accused has the burden, on the standard of the balance of probabilities, to establish that admission of the evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute (see paragraph 30).
The Supreme Court set out a list of factors in Collins, which
should be considered when applying section 24(2) of the
Charter, and held that a trial judge must have “regard to all the
circumstances” in determining whether evidence obtained in
violation of the Charter should be admitted or excluded (at
paragraph 43). It concluded that the evidence seized should
have been excluded because it could not “accept that police
officers take flying tackles at people and seize them by the
throat when they do not have reasonable and probable grounds
to believe that those people are either dangerous or handlers of
drugs” (at paragraph 45).
Subsequently, in R. v. Fliss, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535, the factors
to be considered were summarized by the Supreme Court in
the following manner (at paragraph 75):
1. Does the admission of the evidence affect the fairness of the trial?
2. How serious was the Charter breach?
3. What would be the effect of excluding the evidence
on the repute of the administration of justice?

to exclude evidence if its admis“All of this
sion would affect the fairness of
the trial as opposed to condon- changed with the
ing a serious constitutional vioissuance of . . .
lation” (at paragraph 33).
R. v. Grant.”
Thus, the Supreme Court
started out with a general and
vague test (a consideration of all of the circumstances). It then
developed a test in which the nature of the evidence (conscriptive or non-conscriptive) became the crucial factor in
determining admissibility. In The Grant Trilogy and the Right
Against Self-incrimination (2009), 66 C.R. (6th) 97, Professor
Hamish Stewart summarized the effect of these decisions in the
following manner (at page 100):
Evidence obtained in violation of the Charter is to be
excluded under s. 24(2) where its admission would
“bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
Under the Collins/Stillman approach, trial judges were to
consider whether admission of evidence in the proceedings would make the trial unfair, whether the Charter
violations were serious, and whether exclusion of evidence would have an adverse effect on the repute of the
justice system. And, according to the controversial
majority ruling in Stillman, exclusion under the first
branch was virtually automatic if the evidence obtained
was “conscriptive” (that is, self-incriminatory) or was
derived from conscriptive evidence and was undiscoverable by constitutional methods.

CONSCRIPTIVE VERSUS NON-CONSCRIPTIVE

In R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, the Supreme Court
created a distinction for exclusion purposes based upon
whether the evidence unconstitutionally obtained was conscriptive or non-conscriptive. The Court held in Stillman that
“admission of evidence which falls into the non-conscriptive
category will, as stated in Collins, rarely operate to render the
trial unfair” (at paragraph 74). If the accused, however, was
“compelled to participate in the creation or discovery of the
evidence” then it will be considered to be “conscriptive evidence,” even if it is “real evidence” (at paragraph 75) and its
admission will generally render the trial unfair. A few years
later in R. v. Law, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court confirmed this approach by suggesting that “it will be much easier

“it would be most improvident for this Court to expatiate, in
these early days of life with the Charter upon the meaning of the
expression ‘administration of justice’ and particularly its outer
limits. There will no doubt be, over the years to come, a gradual
build-up in delineation and definition of the words used in the
Charter in s. 24(2)” (at paragraph 12).
5. At page 100. Several Canadian Courts of Appeal have also concluded that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Grant has
cast doubt upon the continued validity of its pre-Grant jurisprudence as regards the application of section 24(2) of the Charter.
In R. v. Blake, [2010] 251 C.C.C. (3d) 3 (Ont. C.A.), for instance,
the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, at paragraph 21, that the
Supreme Court of Canada in Grant “took a judicial wire brush to
the 20 years of jurisprudential gloss that had built up around s.
24(2) and scrubbed down to the bare words of the section.” Sim-

All of this changed with the issuance of the Supreme Court’s
decision in In R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353. The conscriptive versus non-conscriptive dichotomy was abandoned. Professor Stewart describes it as having been “swept away.”5
R. v. GRANT

In Grant, the Court indicated that the “existing jurisprudence” on exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Charter was “difficult to apply and may lead to unsatisfactory
results... we find it our duty, given the difficulties that have
been pointed out to us, to take a fresh look at the frameworks
that have been developed” (at paragraph 3).6
The Supreme Court commenced its fresh look by indicating

ilarly, in R. v. Ngai, [2010] A.J. No. 96 (C.A.), it was held that
Grant has “refocused the section 24(2) analysis and directed
courts to balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society’s
confidence in the judicial system” (at paragraph 33). In R. v.
Wong, [2010] B.C.J. No. 557, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal suggested that the “distinction between conscriptive and
non-conscriptive evidence set out in Stillman is no longer as significant in analyzing admissibility. Reliability, which is often a
hallmark of real evidence will always be a cogent consideration
but will not be dispositive...” (at paragraph 15).
6. Professor Donald Stuart in Welcome Flexibility and Better Criteria
for Section 24(2), (2009), 66 C.R. (6th) 82, suggests that much “of
the voluminous prior jurisprudence on section 24(2) will be of
little moment” as a result of Grant (at page 82).
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that though the test set out in section 24(2) of the Charter is a
“broad and imprecise” one (at
paragraph 60), the “words of s.
24(2) capture its purpose: to
maintain the good repute of the
administration of justice” (at
paragraph 67).7 Thus, the “focus
is not only long-term, but prospective. The fact of the Charter
breach means damage has already been done to the administration of justice” (at paragraph 69). The Supreme Court also indicated that section 24(2) starts “from that proposition and seeks
to ensure that evidence obtained through that breach does not
do further damage to the repute of the justice system.... Finally,
s. 24(2)’s focus is societal. Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing compensation to the accused, but
rather at systemic concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is on the broad
impact of admission of the evidence on the long-term repute of
the justice system” (at paragraphs 69–70).8

“The Supreme
Court concluded
. . . that there are
‘three avenues
of inquiry.’”

THE NEW GRANT TEST

The Supreme Court concluded in Grant that there are “three
avenues of inquiry” to which consideration must be given
when applying section 24(2) of the Charter. At paragraph 71,
these three avenues were described as follows:
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the message the justice
system condones serious state misconduct);9
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected
interests of the accused (admission may send the
message that individual rights count for little); and
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on
its merits.

Though the first two avenues may appear interconnected
they involve two separate and distinct avenues of analysis. In
the first avenue the Court must take an objective approach
(i.e., how serious was the Charter violation?), while in the second avenue a subjective approach must be adopted (i.e., what
effect did the breach of the Charter have on the specific rights
of the accused protected by the section in issue?).
In R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, the Supreme Court of
Canada considered its decision in Grant and indicated that evidence obtained unconstitutionally “should be excluded under
section 24(2) if considering all of the circumstances, its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
This determination requires a balancing assessment involving
three broad inquiries: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the Charterprotected interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in
the adjudication of the case on its merits” (at paragraph 81).
The Supreme Court of Canada also indicated in Grant that
a trial judge’s role when considering a section 24(2) application involves balancing “the assessments under each of these
lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 71). This
might be described as the fourth and final stage of inquiry.
Having described the three-avenue approach created by
Grant, let us start with the avenue involving the seriousness of
the alleged Charter breach.

It is interesting that the Supreme Court of Canada not only
set out these criteria, but that for the first two they included a
comment in brackets. It may be that the Court has added its
own explanatory notes. If so, then it appears that the Court is
encouraging trial judges to consider (1) that admitting evidence obtained by the police as a result of a serious violation
of the Charter will suggest to the public that the Court condones such conduct and (2) that admitting such evidence
when the violation has had a significant impact upon the right
being protected will suggest that the protected right is of little
consequence.

(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the message the justice system
condones serious state misconduct)
In Grant, the Supreme Court held, at paragraph 73, that this
avenue requires a trial judge to evaluate “the seriousness of the
state conduct that led to the breach.” The more severe or deliberate the conduct involved “the greater the need for the courts
to dissociate themselves from that conduct, by excluding evidence linked to that conduct” (at paragraph 72).
In R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 ONCA 290, the Ontario Court of
Appeal considered Grant and indicated that to “determine the
seriousness of the infringement under this line of inquiry, a
court must look to the interests engaged by the right infringed
and examine the extent to which the violation actually
impacted on those interests….An unreasonable search that
intrudes upon an area in which an individual reasonably enjoys
a high expectation of privacy or that demeans a person’s dignity
is more seriousness than one that does not” (at paragraph 111).

7. In R. v. Stanton, [2010] B.C.J. No. 753, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal indicated, at paragraph 52, that the “revised framework
under Grant for the admissibility of evidence under s. 24(2) of the
Charter recognizes that trial judges continue to have a broad discretion in determining whether evidence obtained in breach of a
Charter right will nevertheless be admitted, but the exercise of
that discretion is to be informed and guided by the words of s.
24(2).”
8. Similarly in Marwood v. Commissioner of Police, [2016] NZSC 139,
the Supreme Court of New Zealand noted that when exclusion of
evidence is sought in New Zealand, the “proper assessment to be
made [is] whether the breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act

necessitated exclusion of evidence.” The Supreme Court indicated that the answer to this question “turns, principally, on
assessment of the seriousness of the breach of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act and the extent to which it is proper for the court
to be co-opted into countenancing it. It cannot be sufficient
answer that the ends justify the admission (as is suggested) without further consideration of the nature of the breach” (at paragraph 64).
9. In R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at paragraph 102, the
Supreme Court indicated that the “repute of the administration of
justice is jeopardized by judicial indifference to unacceptable
police conduct.”
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In R. v. Kiene, [2015] A.J. No. 1159 (C.A.), the Alberta
Court of Appeal summarized the test enunciated in Grant as
regards section 24(2) of the Charter by indicating that “the
goal is to preserve public confidence in the rule of law and its
processes” (at paragraph 34):
The Grant test for exclusion of evidence asks whether
a reasonable person, informed of all relevant circumstances and the values underlying the Charter, would
conclude that the admission of the evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute: para
68. Exclusion of the evidence is not a punishment of
those involved; the goal is to preserve public confidence
in the rule of law and its processes: para 73. The court
must balance the seriousness of the Charter-infringing
conduct, the impact of the breach upon the appellant,
and society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on
the merits.
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected
interests of the accused (admission may send the message
that individual rights count for little)
In relation to this avenue, the Supreme Court indicated in
Grant, at paragraph 76, that trial judges must concentrate on
“the seriousness of the impact of the Charter breach on the
Charter-protected interests of the accused.” This requires an
evaluation “of the extent to which the breach actually undermined the interests protected by the right infringed” and the
“degree to which the violation impacted on those interests.”
In R. v. Côté, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215, the Supreme Court considered the second line of inquiry and held that it “deals with
the seriousness of the impact of the Charter violation on the
Charter-protected interests of the accused. The impact may
range from that resulting from a minor technical breach to that
following a profoundly intrusive violation. The more serious
the impact on the accused’s constitutional rights, the more the
admission of the evidence is likely to bring the administration
of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 47).
More recently in R. v. Paterson, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 202, the
Supreme Court noted that the “second inquiry under the s.
24(2) analysis focusses on whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute
from the standpoint of society’s interest in respect for Charter
rights. This entails considering the degree to which a Charter
infringement undermined the Charter-protected interest” (at
paragraph 42).
In R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, the Supreme Court of
Canada had held, at paragraph 104, that the “intrusiveness of
the search is of particular importance” in applying the second
avenue of analysis when a breach of section 8 of the Charter
has occurred (the right to be free from unreasonable searches

10. Similarly, in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the
Supreme Court of the United States noted, at paragraph 4, that
the “exclusionary rule” can generate “substantial social costs” and
constitute a “‘costly toll’ upon truth seeking and law enforcement
objectives.” The same point was made by the Supreme Court of
Ireland in Director of Public Prosecutions v. J.C. [2015] IESC 31, in

or seizures). In Morelli, the
“An unreasonable
unlawful search involved the
search . . . may
accused person’s home and personal computer. The Court
impact . . . on
stated, at paragraph 105, that “it
human dignity.”
is difficult to imagine a more
intrusive invasion of privacy
than the search of one’s home and personal computer.” In contrast, in R. v. Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at paragraph 30,
the Court indicated that “motorists have a lower expectation of
privacy in their vehicles than they do in their homes. As participants in a highly regulated activity, they know that they
may be stopped for reasons pertaining to highway safety .... In
these respects, the intrusion on liberty and privacy represented
by the detention is less severe than it would be in the case of a
pedestrian. Further, nothing in the encounter was demeaning
to the dignity of the appellant.”
In R. v. Stanton (2010), 254 C.C.C. (3d) 421, the second
avenue of inquiry was summarized by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in the following manner (at paragraph 54):
The impact of a Charter breach may range from fleeting and technical to the profoundly intrusive. The more
serious the impact on an accused’s protected interests,
the greater the risk that admission of the evidence may
signal to the public that Charter rights are of little actual
avail to the citizen (para. 76). An unreasonable search
contrary to s. 8 may impact on the protected interests of
privacy, and more broadly, human dignity. An unreasonable search that intrudes on an area in which the individual enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or that
demeans his or her dignity, is more serious than one that
does not (para. 78).
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on
its merits
In relation to this criterion, the Supreme Court suggested in
Grant, at paragraph 79, that Canadian society “generally
expects that a criminal allegation will be adjudicated on its
merits.” Thus, the third avenue of inquiry requires a trial judge
to ask him- or herself “whether the truth-seeking function of
the criminal trial process would be better served by admission
of the evidence, or by its exclusion?” The Court held that the
reliability of the evidence “is an important factor in this line of
inquiry” because the exclusion of reliable evidence can render
a trial “unfair from the public perspective, thus bringing the
administration of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 81).
Ultimately, trial judges must face the question as to “whether
the vindication of the specific Charter violation through the
exclusion of evidence extracts too great a toll on the truthseeking goal of the criminal trial” (at paragraph 82).10

which it indicated that “many courts have recognised, where
cogent and compelling evidence of guilt is found but not admitted on the basis of trivial technical breach, the administration of
justice far from being served, may be brought into disrepute” (at
paragraph 97).
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A number of years later, in
Cole, at paragraph 95, the
Supreme Court held that “the
considerations under this third
inquiry must not be permitted to
overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis….They are nonetheless entitled to appropriate weight and, in
the circumstances of this case,
they clearly weigh against exclusion of the evidence.” In Côté,
the Court held that the “reliability of the evidence and its
importance to the prosecution’s case are key factors” (at paragraph 47). The Supreme Court of Canada also indicated in
Côté that “excluding highly reliable evidence may more negatively affect the truth-seeking function of the criminal law
process where the effect is to ‘gut’ the prosecution’s case” (at
paragraph 47).
More recently in Paterson, the Supreme Court indicated, at
paragraph 51, that the third avenue of inquiry “entails considering the reliability of the evidence and its importance to the
Crown’s case.” The Court also indicated in Paterson that it is
“important not to allow the third Grant factor of society’s interest in adjudicating a case on its merits to trump all other considerations, particularly where (as here) the impugned conduct was serious and worked a substantial impact on the
appellant’s Charter right” (at paragraph 56).
In Stanton, at paragraph 56, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal indicated that “the importance of the evidence to the
prosecution’s case is another factor that may be considered ...
the exclusion of highly reliable evidence may impact more negatively on the repute of the administration of justice where the
remedy effectively guts the prosecution.”
In R. v. Beaulieu, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 248, the trial judge, in a
pre-Grant decision, had found a violation of section 8 of the
Charter, but ruled that the evidence in issue (a gun) was
admissible. In upholding this conclusion, the Supreme Court
touched on the three factors referred to in Grant by stating (at
paragraph 8):

“The seriousness
of the offence
. . . has the
potential to cut
both ways.”

As noted above, the trial judge’s conclusions as to the
seriousness of the breach were central to this case, and
they remain equally relevant under the Grant approach.
As for the impact of the breach, the trial judge took into
account Mr. Beaulieu’s reduced privacy interest in his car
and the limited scope and invasiveness of the search.
With regard to society’s interest in adjudication on the
merits, she concluded that the evidence was crucial to
the Crown’s case. It is also uncontested that a gun is reliable evidence.
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENCE

The seriousness of the offence committed is a factor for consideration though it was held in Grant that it “has the poten-

11. In Wong, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, at paragraph 18,
indicated that though the seriousness of the crime, “while still a
relevant consideration, is perhaps of a lesser weight in the analytical exercise now to be performed under s. 24(2).” It has been
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tial to cut both ways.” The Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 84, that “while the public has a heightened interest in
seeing a determination on the merits where the offence
charged is serious, it also has a vital interest in having a justice
system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal
stakes for the accused are high.”11
More recently, in R. v. Marakah, 2017 S.C.C. 59, after concluding that the police had seized text messages in contravention of the Charter, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence should be excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the
Charter. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
referred to is decision in Grant and indicated that “while the
public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on
the merits where the offence charged is serious” it is “important not to allow... society’s interest in adjudicating a case on its
merits to trump all other considerations” (at paragraph 72).
BODILY EVIDENCE (BLOOD, DNA, ETC.)

The Court held in Grant that “the approach to admissibility
of bodily evidence under s. 24(2) that asks simply whether the
evidence was conscripted should be replaced by a flexible test
based on all the circumstances, as the wording of s. 24(2)
requires. As for other types of evidence, admissibility should
be determined by inquiring into the effect admission may have
on the repute of the justice system, having regard to the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact of the Charter breach
on the protected interests of the accused, and the value of a
trial on the merits” (at paragraph 107).
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE

In relation to derivative evidence (defined in Grant as physical evidence obtained, for instance, as a result of an unconstitutionally obtained statement), the Court held that to “determine whether the admission of derivative evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s.
24(2), courts must pursue the usual three lines of inquiry outlined in these reasons, taking into account the self-incriminatory origin of the evidence in an improperly obtained statement as well as its status as real evidence” (at paragraph 123).
However, the Court also held that discoverability “retains a
useful role, however, in assessing the actual impact of the
breach on the protected interests of the accused. It allows the
court to assess the strength of the causal connection between
the Charter-infringing self-incrimination and the resultant evidence. The more likely it is that the evidence would have been
obtained even without the statement, the lesser the impact of
the breach on the accused’s underlying interest against selfincrimination” (at paragraph 122). Finally, on this point the
Court held that a judge “should refuse to admit evidence
where there is reason to believe the police deliberately abused
their power to obtain a statement which might lead them to
such evidence. Where derivative evidence is obtained by way
of a deliberate or flagrant Charter breach, its admission would

held that in some cases the seriousness of the offence will be a
“neutral” factor (see R. v. Martin (2010), 361 N.B.R. (2d) 251
(C.A.), at paragraph 96).

bring the administration of justice into further disrepute and
the evidence should be excluded” (at paragraph 128).
In in Utah v. Strieff, No. 14–1373 (2016), the Supreme
Court of the United States also considered the admissibility of
derivative evidence (found after an unlawful motor vehicle
stop). It concluded that the evidence was admissible because
“the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the preexisting arrest warrant” (at page 8):
Applying these factors, we hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff’s person was admissible because the
unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the preexisting arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close
in time to Strieff’s arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff’s arrest is a critical
intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of
the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the
causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the
discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to
arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is
no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.12
THE FINAL STEP: THE BALANCING

In Grant, the Supreme Court directed trial judges to assess
section 24(2) applications by making the inquiries referred to
under the three avenues (described by the Court as a “decision
tree”) and then “determine whether, on balance, the admission
of the evidence obtained by Charter breach would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 85).
Similarly, in R. v. Nolet, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at paragraph 54,
the Supreme Court indicated that the “task for courts remains
one of achieving a balance between individual and societal
interests with a view to determining whether the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admission of
the evidence.”
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada has created
a broad societal test in its analysis of section 24(2) of the Charter, which requires a consideration of the long term. Thus, in
R. v. Taylor, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, the Supreme Court indicated,
at paragraph 37, that when “faced with an application for
exclusion under s. 24(2), a court must assess and balance the
effect of admitting the evidence on the public’s confidence in
the justice system, having regard to ‘the seriousness of the
Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of the breach on
the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and the societal
interest in an adjudication on the merits.’”
In Morelli, the Supreme Court said, at paragraph 108, that
in balancing the considerations set out in Grant, trial judges
are required “to bear in mind the long-term and prospective
repute of the administration of justice, focussing less on the

12. The latter words would be very familiar to Canadian judges and
lawyers. In R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, for instance, the
Supreme Court, in holding that evidence obtained in that case in
violation of the Charter was admissible, noted that there was not
“even a whiff of the sort of indifference on the part of the police

particular case than on the
“’No overarching
impact over time of admitting the
rule governs
evidence obtained by infringement of the constitutionally pro- how the balance
tected rights of the accused.” At
is to be struck.’
paragraph 86 of Grant, the final
Grant.”
step in the required analysis was
succinctly summarized by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the following manner:
In all cases, it is the task of the trial judge to weigh
the various indications. No overarching rule governs
how the balance is to be struck. Mathematical precision
is obviously not possible. However, the preceding analysis creates a decision tree, albeit more flexible than the
Stillman self-incrimination test. We believe this to be
required by the words of s. 24(2).
In R. v. Fan, 2017 B.C.C.A. 99, it was indicated that a section 24(2) analysis requires that the evidence “on each line of
inquiry is weighed and all the circumstances are considered in
determining whether admission of the impugned evidence
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. No
one consideration is permitted consistently to trump or overwhelm the others. In all cases, the court must assess the effect
of admission or exclusion on the long-term repute of the justice system and ensure that it is not damaged any further by the
breach” (at paragraph 68).
In R. v. Tsekouras (2017), 353 C.C.C. (3d) 349 (Ont. C.A.),
it was noted that these “lines of inquiry under Grant involve
fact-finding and the assignment of weight to various interests
often at odds with each other. There is no overarching principle that mandates how this balance is to be achieved” (at
paragraph 106).
THE RESULT IN GRANT

In Grant, the Supreme Court concluded that the accused had
been arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter
because the police did not have lawful grounds to detain the
accused. In addition, the Court also concluded that the police
violated section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to advise the
accused that he had the right to “contact counsel without
delay.” As a result, it was necessary for the Court to determine
whether the evidence obtained (a gun obtained as a result of a
statement made by the accused to the police in contravention of
the Charter) should be excluded or admitted. The Supreme
Court concluded that the gun should be admitted.
The Supreme Court held that “the police conduct was not
egregious. The impact of the Charter breach on the accused’s
protected interests was significant, although not at the most serious end of the scale. Finally, the value of the evidence is considerable.... Unlike the situation in R. v. Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R.

to the suspect’s rights that requires a court to disassociate itself
from that conduct” (at paragraph 95). In R. v. Culotta, 2018
ONCA 665, the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that “[g]ood
faith honest errors by the police represent less serious Charter
infringements” (at paragraph 67).
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“[T]he third step
. . . requires a
consideration of
the truth seeking
function of the
trial process.”

494, the police officers here were
operating in circumstances of
considerable legal uncertainty. In
our view, this tips the balance in
favour of admission, suggesting
that the repute of the justice system would not suffer from allowing the gun to be admitted in evidence against the appellant” (at
paragraph 140).13

SYSTEMIC BREACHES OF THE CHARTER

The Supreme Court of Canada most recent consideration of
section 24(2) of the Charter came in R. v. G.T.D., 2018 S.C.C.
7. At issue in this case was whether evidence should be
excluded based upon the Edmonton Police Service’s use of a
standard caution form of warning to arrested individuals,
which had the effect of violating their right to contact counsel
pursuant to section 10(b) of the Charter.
The majority’s decision has been interpreted as indicating
that in assessing the seriousness of a breach of the Charter a
court’s analysis should not be limited to a consideration of the
arresting officer’s behavior individually, but should also
include a pattern of institutional errors, which may have led to
the breach (see R. v. Ippak, 2018 NUCA 3, at paragraphs 43 and
97). However, this appears somewhat overstated. The majority decision by the Supreme Court on this point consists
entirely of the following brief comments (at paragraph 3):
The next issue is whether this breach warrants the
exclusion of G.T.D.’s statement under s. 24(2) of the
Charter. A majority of the Court is of the view that it
does, and relies substantially on the reasons of Justice
Veldhuis at the Court of Appeal. As she noted at para. 83
of her reasons, the Crown had ample opportunity to call
further evidence about Edmonton Police Service training or policy, but chose not to do so. The majority would
therefore allow the appeal and order a new trial.
CONCLUSION

In Grant the Supreme Court dramatically changed the
approach it initially created in relation to whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be excluded or admitted.
Subsequently, its formulation in Grant has been the subject of

13. In Harrison, among the factors that led the Supreme Court of
Canada to conclude that the evidence obtained after a violation of
the Charter should have been excluded was its finding that the
“police conduct in stopping and searching the appellant’s vehicle
without any semblance of reasonable grounds was reprehensible,
and was aggravated by the officer’s misleading testimony in court”
(at paragraph 35).
14. In Trends for Exclusion of Evidence in 2012, (2013) 1 C.R. (7th) 74,
Ariane Asselin conducted an empirical survey of decisions rendered in 2012, which applied section 24(2) of the Charter. She
concluded as follows (at page 74):
This survey shows that there continues to be a high rate of
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significant consideration and commentary. Thus the question:
Where are we in Canada as regards the admission or exclusion
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence? I would proffer the
following as a summary of the principles set out in Grant and
its subsequent consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada:
1. Grant should be seen as a dramatic reformulation
of the test applicable to section 24(2) Charter
analysis.14
2. In considering and applying section 24(2) of the
Charter a trial judge must apply and utilize the three
avenues set out in Grant:
(i) the first step, “the seriousness of the Charterinfringing state conduct,” focuses on the
actions of the police. The first step involves
placing the breach of the Charter along a continuum of misconduct. The more significant
or deliberate the conduct involved, the more
likely the evidence will be excluded. A flagrant disregard for the Charter by the police
will be seen as being very different than a
breach in which the police believe they are
acting in accordance with the law;
(ii) the second step, “the impact of the breach on
the Charter-protected interests of the accused
(admission may send the message that individual rights count for little),” involves a consideration of the the impact of the Charter
breach on the Charter-protected interests of
the accused. This requires an evaluation of the
degree to which the Charter violation
impacted on the interests sought to be protected by the Charter. The intrusiveness of the
breach is of particular importance in this step
of the analysis. Thus, a distinction between
searches involving residences and vehicles has
been made; and
(iii) the third step, “society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits,” requires a
consideration of the importance of the truthseeking function of the trial process. In this
regard, the reliability of the evidence in issue
becomes a crucial factor.

exclusion by trial judges for unconstitutionally obtained evidence comparable to earlier surveys conducted in the wake of
Grant. Particularly noteworthy are the rates of exclusion for
specific types of evidence. The survey identifies a high level of
exclusion for bodily evidence, including breath samples, and a
lower rate of exclusion for testimonial evidence. Moreover,
with respect to non-bodily physical evidence, the survey
shows that the rate of exclusion for drugs is 20% higher than
for guns. These results are surprising given the Supreme Court
of Canada’s (SCC) comments in Grant about how exclusion
could operate in relation to different types of evidence and its
anticipation that certain patterns would emerge. The findings
of this survey signal that the emerging patterns at the trial
court level are perhaps not the ones intended by the SCC.

3. Once these three factors have been applied and considered, the final step involves a balancing of the
effect admission of the unconstitutionally obtained
evidence would have on the repute of the administration of justice versus the effect that excluding the
evidence would have on the repute of the administration of justice. It appears that the key to the last
step in the analysis is balancing the seriousness of
the violation against the importance and reliability
of the evidence.

Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular column (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca.

AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INTERVIEWS
The American Judges Association (AJA) conducted interviews about procedural
fairness with nine national leaders on issues involving judges and the courts. The
interviews, done by Kansas Court of Appeals Judge and past AJA president Steve
Leben, cover the elements of procedural fairness for courts and judges, how judges
can improve fairness skills, and how the public reacts to courts and judges. The
interviews were done in August 2014; job titles are shown as of the date of the
interviews.
Visit http://proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews/ to watch the interviews.
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From ALJs to Wedding Cakes:
Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s October 2017 Term
Todd E. Pettys

O

In a case that had been closely followed in administrativelaw circles, the Court held in Lucia v. SEC1 that the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s administrative-law judges are
“Officers of the United States” who must be appointed through
one of the means authorized by the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The SEC’s practice had been to allow its staff
members to select the agency’s ALJs. When one of those
ALJs—Judge Cameron Elliot—presided over the agency’s
administrative proceeding against Raymond Lucia and issued
stiff sanctions against him, Lucia objected that the proceeding
was invalid because Judge Elliot had been appointed in an
unconstitutional manner. The SEC and the D.C. Circuit
rejected that argument, but the Supreme Court reversed and
ordered that Lucia be given a new hearing before a properly
appointed ALJ.2
The Appointments Clause limits the means by which “Officers of the United States” may be appointed. As a general rule,
all officers must be nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, but Congress can elect to “vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”3
Are the SEC’s ALJs “Officers” within the meaning of that clause,
or are they mere employees about whose hiring the Appointments Clause says nothing? The weightiest factor favoring the
latter conclusion was the fact that all of the ALJs’ rulings may be
reviewed by the Commissioners—either at the request of a party
or upon the initiative of the Commissioners themselves—and

thus there is a significant degree to which the Commissioners
supervise the ALJs’ work. But only Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor were persuaded by that argument.4 Led by Justice
Kagan and relying heavily upon its 1991 ruling in Freytag v.
Commissioner5—a case concerning the status of the United
States Tax Court’s “special trial judges”—the Court concluded
that the SEC’s ALJs are officers. Their positions are “‘continuing’” rather than “‘temporary’” in nature,6 Justice Kagan
explained, and they wield “‘significant authority,’”7 including
(among other things) the power to administer oaths, make evidentiary rulings, manage the conduct of parties and their attorneys, and impose sanctions for disobeying discovery orders. Just
as importantly, they issue decisions that—unless the Commissioners intervene—become the agency’s final word on the parties’ claims and defenses. Because they are thus officers (of the
“inferior” variety), the Court concluded, they may be appointed
by the Commissioners themselves (as the collective head of the
department) but cannot be appointed by the SEC’s staff.8
The Court’s ruling raises an important question concerning
the reach of its 2010 holding in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board.9 In that case, the Court
held that—lest the President’s ability to faithfully execute federal law be thwarted—Congress cannot give officers job security in the form of two or more layers of good-cause protection
from direct or indirect presidential removal. In Free Enterprise
Fund itself, the SEC’s Commissioners were (and today remain)
officers who statutorily are subject to removal by the President
only for cause, and so the members of the SEC’s Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—officers who work under
the Commissioners’ supervision—could not also be given
good-cause protection from removal. So where does that leave
the SEC’s ALJs, who now enjoy “Officer” status? Current federal law says they can be removed by the Merit Systems Protection Board but only for good cause, and the members of the
MSPB themselves may be removed (by the President) only for
good cause. Putting together Lucia and Free Enterprise Fund,
are the job-security protections currently enjoyed by the SEC’s
ALJs unconstitutional? Justice Breyer flagged that issue in a
separate opinion—just as he flagged it when dissenting in Free

Footnotes
1. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
2. The Court also held that the ALJ who presides over Lucia’s case on

8. Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas would have vastly

remand cannot be Judge Elliot, even if he has now been properly
appointed. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor disagreed.
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Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879)).
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per

broadened the group of federal workers who are officers and thus
must be appointed by one of the means specified in the Appointments Clause. Drawing from his perception of the Founders’
likely understanding of the term “Officers,” he argued that the
term includes “all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing,
statutory duty—no matter how important or significant the duty,”
including the likes of “recordkeepers, clerks, and tidewaiters
(individuals who watched goods land at a customhouse).” Id. at
2057 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).

n the final day of the Supreme Court’s October 2017
Term, Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement, capping what already had been a historic year at
1 First Street Northeast. Justice Kennedy’s final year on the
Court yielded a large number of broadly significant rulings in
civil cases on matters concerning administrative agencies, executive power, religious freedom, voter-registration lists,
employer-employee arbitration, public-sector unions, and
states’ power to require out-of-state sellers to collect sales taxes,
to name only a few. There is much to discuss, so off we go.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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Enterprise Fund—but Justice Kagan’s majority declined the
Government’s invitation to address it.
In a pair of cases addressing the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s congressionally authorized “inter partes review” program, the justices sparred over important issues of administrative law. Implemented in 2012, the PTO’s program allows private parties to file a petition asking the PTO to reexamine a
previously issued patent. If the PTO’s director concludes that a
patent challenger is likely to prevail on one or more of its
claims, the director is authorized to launch inter partes review.
Through that process, the patent challenger and patent holder
litigate the merits of the challenged patent, and the PTO’s
Patent Trial and Appeal Board issues a final decision, canceling, confirming, or amending the challenged patent as it sees
fit, subject to the Federal Circuit’s appellate review.
In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,10
the Court ruled 7-2 that the legislation authorizing the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board to revoke patents does not violate Article III’s vesting of the judicial power in courts staffed by politically insulated judges. Particularly noteworthy is the conflict
between two of the Court’s most conservative members—Justice Thomas, who wrote for the majority, and Justice Gorsuch
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts), who dissented. Justice
Thomas emphasized that the Court’s “precedents have given
Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of public
rights to entities other than Article III courts,”11 and “[i]nter
partes review falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine.”12 Justice Thomas reinforced the majority’s conclusion
with the claim that, at the time of the founding, the English
law of patents authorized the Executive—acting through the
Privy Council—to revoke patents. For Justice Gorsuch in dissent, the details of the public-rights doctrine were irrelevant.
The Constitution authorizes only Article III courts to adjudicate matters that England’s common-law courts would have
handled in 1789, he argued, and—on his view of the historical
record—“only courts could hear patent challenges in England
at the time of the founding.”13
Leading a 5-4 Court that divided along familiar lines, Justice
Gorsuch wrote for the majority in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu.14
The issue in that case was whether, when launching the inter
partes review process, the PTO’s director is statutorily authorized to narrow the proceedings to focus on some (rather than
all) of the patent challengers’ claims. The PTO had concluded
that the director did possess this authority, but the Court held
that Congress had unambiguously directed to the contrary. For
Justice Breyer and the three other dissenters, the statutory language was ambiguous and the PTO’s interpretation of the
statute was reasonable, so deference to the agency’s interpretation was appropriate under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
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16.
17.

138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
Id. at 1373.
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Id. at 1381 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
SAS Institute, 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).

Resources Defense Council, Inc.15
“Justice Kennedy
Justice Gorsuch’s reply on
wrote that the
behalf of the majority will give
little comfort to proponents of
Court should
Chevron deference and its role in
reexamine
today’s administrative state:
Chevron ‘in an
“[W]hether Chevron should
remain is a question we may
appropriate
leave for another day.”16 In fact,
case[.]’”
Chevron
skepticism
about
emerged as a theme as the Term
proceeded. In his opinion for a 5-4 majority in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis17 (discussed below under the “Arbitration” heading), Justice Gorsuch similarly noted that “[n]o party to these
cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron deference.”18 In a
concurring opinion filed in a subsequent case concerning the
removal of nonpermanent residents, Justice Kennedy even
more explicitly urged litigants—and ultimately the Court—to
give Chevron a second look. He said that he was “troubl[ed]”
by lower courts’ frequent “reflexive deference” to agencies’
statutory interpretations, and that “more troubling still” is
courts’ deference to agencies on statutory questions concerning the agencies’ own authority.19 Justice Kennedy wrote that
the Court should reexamine Chevron “in an appropriate case,”
to ensure that the prevailing rules of statutory interpretation
“accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles
and the function and province of the Judiciary.”20
ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Adopted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort
Statute declares, in full: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”21 In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,22 roughly 6,000
foreign nationals sought to rely upon the ATS when suing Arab
Bank in a federal district court. They alleged that, with the aid
of its New York branch, the bank had helped finance terrorist
attacks on the plaintiffs and their families in the Middle East.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that—until Congress says otherwise—“foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits
brought under the ATS.”23 A ruling to the contrary, Justice
Kennedy wrote for the majority, would raise complex foreignpolicy issues and would not further the original purpose of the
ATS, which was to provide “foreign plaintiffs a remedy for
international-law violations in circumstances where the
absence of such a remedy might provoke foreign nations to
hold the United States accountable.”24 In a lengthy dissent
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, Justice
Sotomayor argued that “[n]othing about the corporate form in

18. Id. at 1629.
19. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

concurring).
Id. at 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
Id. at 1407.
Id. at 1406.
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itself raises foreign-policy concerns that require the Court, as
a matter of common-law discretion, to immunize all foreign corporations from liability under the ATS, regardless
of the specific law-of-nations
violations alleged.”25

ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE

In Murphy v. NCAA,26 the Court held 7-2 that Congress’s Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act ran afoul of the
anti-commandeering doctrine. In that legislation, Congress had
taken steps to curb gambling on amateur and professional
sports. Rather than make sports gambling a federal crime, however, Congress declared that states could not “authorize” gambling on “competitive games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or
more performances of such athletes in such games.”27 The
financial and political burden of ensuring that sports gambling
did not occur, in other words, would rest primarily on state
governments.
Relying heavily upon its rulings in 1992’s New York v. United
States28 and 1997’s Printz v. United States,29 the Court held that
“[a] more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”30 The statute, Justice Alito wrote for the majority,
“unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may
not do. . . . It is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop
legislators from voting on any offending proposals.”31 If Congress wishes to ban gambling on sports, the Court concluded,
it must do so directly. Finding the commandeering provision
not severable from the rest of the legislation, the Court struck
down the entire Act.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed qualms
about the Court’s severability precedents insofar as they
require judges to speculate about what legislators would have
preferred in counterfactual scenarios. By virtue of her having
filed a dissent, we know that Justice Ginsburg—joined by Justice Sotomayor—did not embrace the Court’s reasoning on the
anti-commandeering issue. Rather than say anything on that
subject, however, she focused all of her attention on attacking
the majority’s conclusion that the entire Act had to fall. On
this issue of severability, Justice Breyer aligned himself with
the dissent.
ARBITRATION

In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,32 the Court handed down a
major 5-4 ruling concerning arbitration and employer-

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id.
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
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employee agreements. The case concerned contracts in which
employees had agreed to use individualized arbitration—
rather than class or collective actions—to resolve any disagreements that arose between them and their employers.
When employees filed class and collective actions alleging they
were owed overtime pay, the employers sought to compel individualized arbitration pursuant to the prior agreements. The
employees argued that those agreements were unenforceable.
Pointing out that the Federal Arbitration Act’s saving clause
allows courts to declare arbitration agreements void “upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract,”33 the employees insisted their contracts’ arbitration provisions violated their right under the National Labor
Relations Act “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”34
The Court rejected the employees’ argument. Writing for
the five-member majority, Justice Gorsuch first emphasized
that the FAA’s saving clause explicitly refers only to grounds
that can render “any” contract unenforceable. That is a reference, he explained, to such things as fraud and unconscionability, rather than to legal grounds that apply only to particular kinds of agreements. Turning to the employees’ argument that the NLRA’s protection of “other concerted activities”
supersedes the FAA in any event, the Court disagreed. Group
litigation akin to today’s class and collective actions was rare
when Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, Justice Gorsuch
said, and the text of the statute provides no clear evidence that
Congress had such litigation devices in mind.
Justice Ginsburg emphatically dissented, arguing that the
majority had disregarded Congress’s effort to protect employees’ ability to find “strength in numbers.”35 “Congressional
correction of the Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’
rights to act in concert,” she wrote, “is urgently in order.”36
CONTRACTS CLAUSE AND DIVORCE

Like twenty-five other states, Minnesota has enacted legislation declaring that—unless a court says otherwise in a
divorce decree—a divorce automatically revokes a person’s
designation of his or her former spouse as the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy. The legislation permits the insured individual to retain the former spouse as the beneficiary, however,
by sending the insurance company a notification to that effect.
Suppose the insured fails to send any such notice. Does the
state’s default rule violate the Contracts Clause37 if the
insured’s contract was formed prior to the legislation’s enactment?
In Sveen v. Melin38—a case pitting a former wife against two
children who had been named as a policy’s contingent beneficiaries—the Court held 8-1 that Minnesota’s law is constitu-

9 U.S.C. § 2.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . .
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
38. 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

tionally permissible. Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan
found that “Minnesota’s revocation-on-divorce statute does not
substantially impair pre-existing contractual arrangements.”39
She explained:
First, the statute is designed to reflect a policyholder’s
intent—and so to support, rather than impair, the contractual scheme. Second, the law is unlikely to disturb
any policyholder’s expectations because it does no more
than a divorce court could always have done. And third,
the statute supplies a mere default rule, which the policyholder can undo in a moment.40
Justice Gorsuch dissented, questioning whether the Court’s
analytic framework for Contracts Clause cases is consistent
“with the Constitution’s original public meaning,”41 and arguing that changing a life insurance policy’s beneficiary designation amounts to a substantial and unreasonable impairment of
a contract. Minnesota’s law, he concluded, “cannot survive an
encounter with even the breeziest of Contracts Clause tests.”42
ELECTIONS43

Throughout much of the Term, there was widespread anticipation that the justices would shed significant new light on
whether the Constitution gives the judiciary a prominent role
in policing partisan gerrymandering. It was not to be. Much
(though not all44) of the attention was focused on Gill v. Whitford,45 a case concerning Wisconsin Republicans’ adoption of
district lines that, in 2012, enabled them to win 60 of the State
Assembly’s 99 seats with just 48.6 percent of the statewide vote
and that, in 2014, enabled them to win 63 of the State Assembly’s 99 seats with 52 percent of the statewide vote. A dozen
Democratic voters in the state challenged the map, arguing
that, by making it harder for Democrats than Republicans to
convert votes into victories, the legislature had violated the
plaintiffs’ rights of association and equal protection. The threemember district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
enjoined the state from using the map in future elections, but
the verdict did not hold. The justices unanimously concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the individualized
harm necessary to establish standing under Article III.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explained that,
although the plaintiffs had included a First Amendment association claim in their complaint, they proceeded to litigate their
case almost entirely upon a theory of vote dilution. Specifically,

Id. at 1822.
Id.
Id. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1831 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
I discuss Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876
(2018)—a case concerning political apparel at polling places—
under the “Speech” heading, below.
44. The Court also handed down a ruling in Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.
Ct. 1942 (2018), a case concerning Maryland’s use of a districting
map that allegedly was drawn to retaliate against Republican voters in the state’s Sixth Congressional District. In a per curiam ruling, the justices unanimously concluded that the balance of equi39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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tiffs sought to prove that Wisconsin Democrats had (in some
instances) been crammed into districts where their numbers
were far greater than necessary to elect a Democratic candidate
and had (in other instances) been scattered among districts in
which their low numbers would make it exceedingly difficult to
elect a candidate of their choosing. In advancing those claims at
trial, the plaintiffs emphasized what they believed Republican
legislators had done to Democratic voters on a statewide basis;
the plaintiffs never sought to prove that they themselves had been
packed or cracked in their own individual districts and that
redrawing the boundaries of all of the state’s legislative districts
was necessary to remedy those individual harms. Rather than
dismiss the case outright for lack of jurisdiction, however, the
Court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to try to
produce the evidence necessary to establish standing.46
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice
Kagan filed a concurring opinion aimed at training a flashlight
on the legal path that lies ahead. She suggested that it should
not be difficult on remand for the plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence of individualized harm, she appeared to encourage the plaintiffs to develop their First Amendment association
claim, and she argued that today’s technology-empowered partisan gerrymandering produces democracy-degrading harms
that only courts can effectively remedy. In his opinion for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly declined to take a position on whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
The Court divided 5-4 along familiar lines in two of the
Term’s election-law cases. The first—Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute47—concerned one of the ways in which Ohio
(together with a handful of other states) purports to maintain
an accurate list of individuals who are eligible to vote because
they continue to reside in the voting districts for which they are
registered.48 Under the program in question, Ohio first identifies registered voters who, over a two-year period, failed to vote
or engage in any other voter activity (such as signing a petition). The state then sends each of those individuals a notice
alerting them that their voter registration will be canceled
unless they either (1) return a preaddressed, postage-prepaid

45.
46.

47.
48.

ties and the public interest weighed in support of the district
court’s refusal to issue a preliminary injunction barring Maryland
from using that map in the 2018 congressional elections.
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas refused to join this part
of the Court’s opinion. In these two justices’ view, the Court
should have dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims altogether.
138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).
The litigated program is not Ohio’s sole means of purporting to
keep its list of eligible voters up to date. The state also relies upon
change-of-address data supplied by the U.S. Postal Service.
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card confirming that they continue
to reside in the district where they
are registered or (2) vote in at least
one election during the following
four years. The battle in Husted was
about whether this program violates federal statutory law.
At the heart of the dispute were
two provisions of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.
The first—referred to by the Court as “subsection (d)”—says
that a state cannot remove a person from its voting rolls unless
one of two things has happened: (1) the person confirms in writing that he or she has moved out of the district where he or she
is registered to vote or (2) the person (a) fails to return a preaddressed, postage-prepaid card in response to a mailed notice that
the voter’s registration will be canceled if he or she does not vote
during the period covered by the following two federal general
elections and then (b) does indeed fail to cast a ballot during
that four-year period. As described thus far, Ohio’s program
appears unassailably compliant with the NVRA’s requirements.
But the NVRA contains a second provision—the “Failure-toVote Clause”—that complicates matters. It declares that, while a
state may rely upon the list-pruning procedures specified in subsection (d), a state cannot remove a person from its voting rolls
“by reason of the person’s failure to vote.”49 Does Ohio violate
this provision when it uses a person’s failure to vote as the sole
basis for triggering the notification process and four-year clock
authorized by subsection (d)?
Led by Justice Alito, a majority of the Court concluded that
Ohio’s program is permissible. Justice Alito reasoned that the
Failure-to-Vote Clause prohibits a state from relying solely
upon a person’s nonvoting as a basis for removing him or her
from the state’s list of authorized voters. For that interpretation, Justice Alito relied heavily upon the Help America Vote
Act of 2002, in which Congress clarified that “registrants who
have not responded to a notice and who have not voted in 2
consecutive general elections for Federal office shall be
removed from the official list of eligible voters, except that no
registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to
vote.”50 Ohio had not relied “solely” upon individuals’ failure
to vote, the Court found—it had also relied upon individuals’
failure to respond to mailings alerting them that their voter
registrations were in peril. The majority concluded that Ohio
had thus met Congress’s standards.
Joined in dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,51 and
Kagan, Justice Breyer argued that Congress had barred states
from using a person’s failure to vote as the sole basis for
launching a process that may culminate in his or her removal
from the voting rolls. He further contended that Ohio’s pro-

gram was unreasonable—and thus violated another provision
of the NVRA52—because the number of registered voters who
fail to respond to their written notifications vastly exceeds the
number of voters whom statistics indicate likely did, in fact,
move to a different state or voting district.
Justice Alito wrote for an identically composed five-member
majority in Abbott v. Perez,53 a case concerning congressional
and state districting maps that Texas’s Republican-led legislature adopted in 2013. The next few sentences will give readers
a taste of the complexity that awaits them in the full opinion.
The Texas legislature adopted the contested maps in 2013,
amidst litigation concerning maps that it had previously
adopted in 2011. With only a few modifications, the 2013
maps—which the state deployed for the 2014 and 2016 elections—were the same maps that a three-member federal district court produced on an interim basis for the 2012 elections
during the litigation over the 2011 maps. In the 2017 ruling
that precipitated the Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott, the
district court held that the reason the legislature in 2013
adopted the district court’s 2012 maps was because it believed
those maps would discriminate against racial-minority voters
in some of the same ways that, in the court’s judgment, the legislature had illegally intended back when it drew the 2011
maps. Wholly apart from that finding of unlawful discriminatory intent, the district court further held that three districts
diluted the strength of Latino voters in violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act and that a fourth district—House District 90—was an impermissible racial gerrymander.
The Supreme Court agreed that House District 90 had been
illegally drawn along racial lines, but reversed the district court
in all other respects. A preliminary issue on which the nine justices narrowly divided was whether the Court had jurisdiction
in the first place. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, the Court has
mandatory appellate jurisdiction to review any issuance or
denial of an injunction by a three-member federal district
court. The complicating factor here arose from the fact that the
district court never explicitly granted injunctive relief. What
did happen is that the court announced that the state’s 2013
maps were illegal and needed to be fixed; it gave the state three
days to tell the court whether the Texas legislature would take
steps to remedy the problems; Texas’s governor declared that
the state would not be taking any action; and the district court
scheduled hearings to discuss what should happen next.
Rather than participate in the remedy-focused hearings that
the district court had scheduled, Texas appealed to the
Supreme Court. Did Section 1253 give the Court jurisdiction
to hear the case?
A majority of the Court concluded that it did. The district
court’s orders had the “‘practical effect’” of an injunction,54 Jus-

49. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2).
50. 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A).
51. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor accused the

52. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4) (directing each state to “conduct a
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majority of “ignor[ing] the history of voter suppression against
which the NVRA was enacted and uphold[ing] a program that
appears to further the very disenfranchisement of minority and
low-income voters that Congress set out to eradicate.” Husted,
138 S. Ct. at 1865 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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(emphasis added).
53. 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
54. Id. at 2319 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79,
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tice Alito wrote, and this is all that Section 1253 requires. For
Justice Sotomayor and her colleagues in dissent, the majority’s
handling of the jurisdictional question was far too permissive
and signaled the majority’s willingness to “go[] out of its way”
to uphold racially discriminatory maps.55
On the merits, the majority held that the district court
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the state, requiring it to demonstrate that, when it adopted the state’s current
maps in 2013, it had abandoned the racially discriminatory
objectives that, in the district court’s judgment, animated the
legislature’s prior adoption of the 2011 maps. The dissent
insisted that the district court had kept the burden of proof on
the maps’ challengers, and argued that the majority had failed
to give proper deference to the district court’s factual findings
concerning the 2013 legislature’s motivations. The justices disagreed just as sharply on whether the district court had properly found that three of the districts violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act by diluting Latino voters’ strength. The justices found agreement only with respect to House District 90,
one of the rare districts that the legislature in 2013 had not
simply copied from the district court’s own 2012 work. Texas
conceded that race was the predominant factor for drawing
House District 90’s boundaries, but argued that Section 2
necessitated the state’s race-conscious actions. None of the justices was persuaded by that argument.56
EXECUTIVE POWER

After promising on the campaign trail to curb the influx of
Muslims into the United States, and after litigating an initial
executive order that some concluded was aimed at fulfilling
that promise, President Trump issued the presidential proclamation at issue in Trump v. Hawaii.57 The president issued that
proclamation after several federal agencies worked together at
his request to identify countries that—by virtue of their documentation systems, links to terrorist groups, and other factors—fail to provide adequate assurance that their nationals
traveling to the United States would not pose a security threat
upon their arrival. The president’s proclamation imposes substantial travel restrictions on foreign nationals from Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. The
order provides various waivers and exemptions, and also provides for a reassessment of those countries’ status every 180
days. Together with U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who have family members in the targeted nations, the
State of Hawaii challenged the proclamation, arguing that it

55. Id. at 2335 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
56. Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas filed a one-paragraph

concurring opinion, arguing that Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act does not even apply to redistricting, and that compliance with
Section 2 thus “cannot provide a basis for invalidating any district,
and it cannot provide a justification for the racial gerrymander in
House District 90.” Id. at 2335 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
58. The majority declined to say whether it approved of the nationwide scope of the injunction that the district court had issued. In
a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas questioned district courts’
power to issue nationwide injunctions, observed that district
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issued a nationwide injunction
barring the president from
implementing the proclamation, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
Splitting 5-4 along familiar lines, the Court reversed.58 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that, so
far as statutory authority is concerned, the president’s proclamation falls squarely within the power that Congress conferred
in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). That statute declares that,
[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any
aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States
would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, he may by proclamation . . . suspend the entry of
all aliens or any class of aliens . . . or impose on the entry
of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that this statutory provision
“exudes deference to the President in every clause” and that
the proclamation “falls well within this comprehensive delegation.”59
With respect to the Establishment Clause, the majority
acknowledged the President’s anti-Muslim statements and
hinted that those statements were not consistent with the
nation’s historic commitment to religious freedom.60 When it
comes to evaluating a president’s decisions about whom to
exclude from the country for national-security reasons, however, the majority said that the judiciary should apply nothing
more searching than rational-basis review. The Court then
upheld the president’s proclamation, finding that it can reasonably be understood as a measure aimed at preventing the
entry of foreign nationals who cannot be adequately vetted for
security risks. The majority placed particular weight on the
proclamation’s content, the multi-agency review on which the
president purported to rely, the fact that the proclamation
leaves much of the world’s Muslim population free to travel to
the United States, and the fact that the president has targeted
countries that Congress and prior administrations have
deemed problematic.

courts are issuing such injunctions with increasing frequency, and
urged the Court to consider the issue in a future case.
59. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408.
60. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy made the point more
unambiguously. Even when government officials act beyond the
reach of judicial scrutiny or intervention, Justice Kennedy wrote,
they should honor their oath to uphold the Constitution by honoring “its meaning and its promise.” To send the appropriate message to “[a]n anxious world,” he wrote, “[i]t is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these constitutional guarantees and
mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs.”
Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Breyer dissented,
joined by Justice Kagan, arguing
that there is evidence indicating
that, although the proclamation
might be valid on its face, it is
not being applied as written.
They invited the district court to
explore that possibility on
remand. If pressed to rule on the
proclamation without any further litigation, however, these
justices said that the evidence of anti-Muslim bias is sufficient to
render the proclamation unconstitutional. Joined by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor argued the Establishment Clause
point at greater length, insisting that—based on a long list of
statements made by President Trump both before and after taking office—“a reasonable observer would conclude that the
Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus.”61 Justice
Sotomayor also appeared to worry that the Court itself was manifesting anti-Muslim bias by looking closely at government
actors’ past statements to root out anti-Christian bias in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission62 (discussed under the “Religion” heading, below) but by refusing to
make any significant evidentiary use of President Trump’s antiMuslim statements. Justice Sotomayor also warned that the
majority’s ruling bore “stark parallels” to Korematsu v. United
States,63 in which the Court infamously upheld President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s order authorizing the military to place
thousands of Japanese-Americans in internment camps during
World War II.64 On behalf of the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
replied that “it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant
order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission.”65
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the legislative history’s silence on the question of service advisors’ status is insignificant. Writing for the dissent, Justice
Ginsburg argued that, because service advisors do not themselves typically perform repairs, they fall outside the exemption and thus are entitled to overtime pay under the statute. By
refusing to construe the servicing exemption narrowly, Justice
Ginsburg charged, the majority disregarded “more than half a
century of our precedent,” “without even acknowledging that
it [was doing so].”68
RELIGION69

Suppose you take your car to a dealership for servicing. A
service advisor greets you, listens while you describe the automotive problems you’ve been experiencing, recommends a
particular course of action, and telephones you if the mechanic
spots any unforeseen problems while doing the work. Is your
service advisor “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
thus exempt from that statute’s overtime-pay requirement? The
Court answered that question in the affirmative in Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.66 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Thomas reasoned that “[s]ervice advisors are integral to
the servicing process,”67 there is no good reason to continue
the practice of construing the FLSA’s exemptions narrowly, and

In one of the Term’s most widely discussed cases, the justices ruled 7-2 in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission70 that Colorado officials had violated the
First Amendment free-exercise rights of a Christian baker who
refused to produce a custom-made wedding cake for a samesex couple. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission determined that the baker, Jack Phillips, had violated the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act, which forbids discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation (among other traits) in places of
public accommodation.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy observed that, as
a general matter, “religious and philosophical objections . . . do
not allow business owners and other actors in the economy
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods
and services under a neutral and generally applicable law.”71
Were the rule otherwise, Justice Kennedy explained, “a long
list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages
and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus
resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the
history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal
access to goods, services, and public accommodations.”72
But in this particular instance, Justice Kennedy wrote, Colorado officials manifested “a clear and impermissible hostility
toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated [Phillips’s]
objection.”73 During public hearings on Phillips’s case, for
example, a member of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
had indicated that Phillips’s religious objections amounted to
“‘one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric.’”74 Moreover, in
at least three instances, the commission had ruled that bakers
could refuse to make cakes conveying messages of disapproval
of same-sex marriage, and the manner in which the commission handled those cases differed in noteworthy ways from the
manner in which it handled Phillips’s case. Putting all of those
evidentiary pieces together, the Court concluded that the commission had violated “the First Amendment’s guarantee that
our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”75
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Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas wrote a separate
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
arguing that Phillips’s custom-made wedding cakes amounted
to protected expression and that Colorado could restrict that
expression only if its reasons for doing so were sufficient to
satisfy strict scrutiny. (The majority declined to reach Phillips’s
free-speech claim.) Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg dissented, finding insufficient evidence of hostility
toward Phillips’s religion. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent prompted
Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Alito) to respond with a
concurrence aimed at underscoring the evidence of impermissible hostility.

change is well within Congress’s authority and does not
violate Article III.80

Joined by Justices Kennedy and
Gorsuch in dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts wasn’t buying it. Never
before, he argued, had Congress
“gone so far as to target a single
party for adverse treatment and
direct the precise disposition of his pending case.”81 The Chief
Justice wrote:

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Two years ago, the Justices all agreed that Congress could
not enact a statute declaring that, in the pending hypothetical
case of Smith v. Jones, “Smith wins.”76 In 2018’s Patchak v.
Zinke,77 however, the justices sharply divided on whether that
is what Congress had done in a lawsuit involving the Match-EBe-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”)
in southwestern Michigan. In 2009, the Secretary of the Interior took a 147-acre tract of land known as the Bradley Property into trust for the benefit of the Band so that the Band
could build a casino there. At the same time those events were
occurring, a nearby landowner—David Patchak—was pursuing federal litigation challenging the legality of the Secretary’s
actions. In 2012, the Supreme Court rejected the Secretary’s
defense of sovereign immunity and held that Patchak’s lawsuit
could proceed.78 Congress then enacted a statute ratifying the
Secretary’s actions and declaring that “an action (including an
action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment
of this Act) relating to the [Bradley Property] shall not be filed
or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”79 Was that an unconstitutional declaration of “Smith
wins”?
No, concluded a plurality formed by Justices Thomas,
Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Writing for that group, Justice
Thomas explained that the key question was whether Congress
had purported to compel a result in a particular lawsuit under
old law (impermissible) or whether Congress had changed the
law and thereby influenced the outcome in a pending lawsuit
(permissible). The plurality determined that Congress had
done the latter:
[The statute] changes the law. Specifically, it strips
federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to”
the Bradley Property. Before the Gun Lake Act, federal
courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Now they do not. This kind of legal

76. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 n.17 (2016); id.
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at 1326; id. at 1334-35 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomie Indians v.
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012).
Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128
Stat. 1913 (2014).
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, 138 S. Ct. at 905.

“[Justice Kagan]
accused [the
majority] of
‘weaponizing
the First
Amendment[.]’”

Does the plurality really believe that there is a material difference between a law stating “The court lacks
jurisdiction over Jones’s pending suit against Smith” and
one stating “In the case of Smith v. Jones, Smith wins”? In
both instances, Congress has resolved the specific case
in Smith’s favor.82
Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg opted to
avoid the “Smith wins” issue altogether. All that Congress had
done here, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, was reassert the federal
government’s sovereign immunity in any action concerning the
Bradley Property. Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to say
that she would join the dissent on the “Smith wins” question,
were it not for the strength of Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning on
sovereign immunity. With their two votes added to those in the
plurality, the Band emerged from the lawsuit victorious.
SPEECH

If points were given to each ruling based on the degree to
which its outcome was important, predictable, and likely to produce a 5-4 split along familiar ideological lines, the prize this
year would likely go to Janus v AFSCME,83 handed down on the
Term’s final day. In 2012 and 2014,84 the Court’s Republican
appointees signaled that they had serious constitutional doubts
about Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.85 In that landmark
1977 ruling, the Court held that the First Amendment permits a
public-sector union and the governmental employer with which
it contracts to require employees within a union-represented
bargaining unit to pay the union “agency fees,” even if those
employees have refused to become union members. “Agency
fees” are fees calculated to cover an employee’s share of the costs
the union incurs in collective bargaining and related activities.
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, the eight-member Court
divided 4-4 in a case that asked whether Abood should be
retained or overruled.86 With Justice Gorsuch now holding the
Court’s ninth seat, the 5-4 Janus Court explicitly overruled

Id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 920 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. SEIU, 567
U.S. 298 (2012).
85. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
86. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016)
(per curiam).
81.
82.
83.
84.
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Abood, holding that agency-fee
requirements violate the First
Amendment rights of public
employees who are not union
members and do not wish to
subsidize the union’s speech.
Justice Alito wrote for the
majority. “Forcing free and
independent individuals to
endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning,” he
said, and “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the speech of
other private speakers” is no less troubling.87 Pointing out that
the federal government and twenty-eight states ban agency fees,
Justice Alito found that imposing such fees is not necessary to
create functional workplaces and successful employeremployee relations. Nor is the government’s interest in preventing free-riding by non-members on the backs of dues-paying
union members sufficiently compelling to justify forcing nonmembers to subsidize speech they find objectionable.88 With
respect to the analytic framework launched in Pickering v. Board
of Education89 for evaluating public employees’ freedom of
speech, Justice Alito found that Pickering is a bad fit for determining the scope of the government’s power to compel large
numbers of its employees to speak. Even if the Court did apply
Pickering here, he wrote, unions would lose. The positions that
unions take in collective bargaining on wages, health insurance,
and the like concern matters of great public significance, and
there is no governmental interest sufficiently weighty to justify
requiring employees to subsidize the union’s speech on those
subjects. Turning to stare decisis, the Court said that the doctrine “applies with perhaps least force of all to decisions that
wrongly denied First Amendment rights.”90 In the eyes of the
majority, neither reliance interests nor any other factor weighed
heavily in favor of retaining the Abood framework.
Justice Kagan wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. She argued that, consistent
with Pickering and other cases, “the Abood regime was a paradigmatic example of how the government can regulate speech
in its capacity as an employer.”91 “But the worse part of today’s
opinion,” she wrote, “is where the majority subverts all known
principles of stare decisis,”92 overturning Abood for no better
reason than that the justices in the majority “wanted to.”93 She
accused those justices of “weaponizing the First Amendment,”94 using it to declare winners and losers in economic and
social matters that should be left to the democratic process.

The justices found somewhat greater unity in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky.95 Led by Chief Justice Roberts, the 7-2
Court struck down Minnesota’s wide-ranging ban on political
apparel in polling places on Election Day. Finding that polling
places are nonpublic forums, where speech restrictions need
merely be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable, the Court did not
entirely close the door to speech restrictions in those locations.
The Chief Justice emphasized that “we see no basis for rejecting Minnesota’s determination that some forms of advocacy
should be excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as an
island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their
choices.”96 The problem with Minnesota’s law concerned the
First Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. In the eyes of
the majority, the state had failed “to articulate some sensible
basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay
out.”97 The state had argued that the ban extended only to
messages concerning matters on which candidates or parties
had taken positions, but the Court found that “[a] rule whose
fair enforcement requires an election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of every candidate and
party on the ballot is not reasonable.”98 The state ran into further trouble with the Court at oral argument when handling
the justices’ hypotheticals. The state’s attorneys argued, for
example, that a shirt bearing the text of the Second Amendment would be barred, while a shirt bearing the text of the
First Amendment would be permitted. The Court concluded
that Minnesota’s law swept too broadly and left election officials with too much unguided discretion.99
In the Term’s other major ruling on speech—National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra100—the 5-4 Court
weighed in against a California law requiring that notices of
specified types be posted in pro-life clinics providing pregnancy-related services. The law requires licensed clinics to
post notices alerting clients that the state provides free or lowcost family-planning services—including abortions—and to
post a phone number that clients can call for further information about those services. The law requires unlicensed clinics
to post a notice alerting clients that the clinics’ personnel are
not licensed to provide medical services. The Ninth Circuit
denied clinics’ request for preliminary injunctive relief against
both requirements, finding that the First Amendment gives
California significant latitude to regulate “professional speech”
and that the clinics are unlikely to succeed on the merits at
trial. The Supreme Court, however, reversed.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Thomas

87. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
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“[Justice Thomas]
drew at least a
loose parallel
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taken by Mao
Zedong[.]”
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the Court should have certified the case to the Minnesota
Supreme Court for a definitive construction of the challenged
statute. The majority rejected that suggestion, finding (among
other things) that the state had raised the possibility of certification “very late in the day” and that neither the state nor the dissent had “suggested a viable alternative construction that the Minnesota Supreme Court might adopt instead.” Id. at 1891 n.7.
100. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

turned first to the law concerning licensed clinics. California’s
requirement is content-based, he explained, because it alters
the content of what the clinics are required to tell their clients.
He then said there is no historical basis for the Ninth Circuit’s
(and some other lower courts’) finding that content-based regulations of professional speech merit something less demanding than strict scrutiny. The closest the Court has come to that
view, Justice Thomas wrote, is in rulings applying a more permissive form of review to “laws that require professionals to
disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’” regarding the services they provide and in rulings allowing states to “regulate professional conduct, even
though that conduct incidentally involves speech.”101 The
Court found that neither of those lines of precedent was
applicable here. In a remarkable passage, Justice Thomas drew
at least a loose parallel between California’s requirement and
actions taken by Mao Zedong, the Soviets, the Nazis, and Nicolae Ceausescu. Even if intermediate scrutiny were applied, the
Court concluded, the notice requirement could not meet it
because, if the state’s aim is to inform low-income women
about state-sponsored services, the requirement is vastly
under-inclusive. With respect to the notice requirement
imposed on unlicensed clinics, the Court held both that the
state has not yet identified any real, non-hypothetical need that
the requirement meets and that the law is unduly burdensome.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in dissent, Justice Breyer argued that (among other things) the
Court’s ruling threatens to imperil a vast range of state laws
requiring speech of various kinds; that the majority undermined the evenhanded rule of law by striking down a statute
requiring a notice about abortion services while not satisfactory distinguishing laws requiring a notice about adoption services; and that the majority was insufficiently deferential to the
state’s conclusion that clients of unlicensed clinics should be
alerted on-site that the personnel at those clinics are not
licensed to provide medical care.
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

When a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a
given claim, the supplemental jurisdiction statute—28 U.S.C. §
1367—authorizes the court also to take jurisdiction over state
claims that form part of “the same case or controversy.”102 If a
court subsequently dismisses the claim over which it initially
had original jurisdiction, it typically will also dismiss any additional claims that it had swept in. When that occurs, the
claimant might naturally wish to file his or her trailing claims
in state court. But what if the state’s statute of limitations for
those claims expired during the federal proceedings? Congress
anticipated that problem in Section 1367(d):
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action
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Id. at 2366.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
138 S. Ct. 594 (2018).
Section 1367(e) instructs federal courts to treat D.C. law like
state law.

that is voluntarily dismissed at
the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period
of 30 days after it is dismissed
unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period.

“[T]he Court
did not entirely
close the door
to speech
restrictions in
[polling
places].”

In Artis v. District of Columbia,103
Stephanie Artis sought to take advantage of that tolling provision. She had sued the District of Columbia in federal court for
employment discrimination, asserting a claim under federal law
as well as claims under D.C. law.104 At the time Artis filed her
suit, nearly two years remained in the limitations period for her
D.C. claims. Two and a half years later, the federal district court
granted the District’s motion for summary judgment on the federal claim and declined to retain jurisdiction over Artis’s remaining claims. Artis filed the non-federal claims in the D.C. Superior Court 59 days later. Were those claims now time-barred?
Dividing 5-4, the Court held that the claims were timely
filed. All of the justices agreed that there were two possible
ways to read Section 1367’s tolling provision. On the “stop the
clock” reading, the clock on D.C.’s limitations period entirely
stopped during the federal proceedings, such that Artis had
roughly two years to file her D.C. claims after the federal district court dismissed them. On the “grace period” reading, the
clock on D.C.’s limitations period continued to run, but Section 1367(d) ensured that, if that clock had counted down to
zero by the time her D.C. claims were dismissed, Artis would
have at least 30 days to file those claims in an appropriate
court. Led by Justice Ginsburg, a majority of the Court adopted
the “stop the clock” interpretation, finding that, in all other
legislation in which Congress has used the word “tolled,” it has
meant “‘suspended,’ or ‘paused,’ or ‘stopped.’”105 Writing for
the dissent, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s ruling
“ensures that traditional state law judgments about the appropriate lifespan of state law claims will be routinely displaced—
and displaced in favor of nothing more than a fortuity (the
time a claim sits in federal court) that bears no rational relationship to any federal interest.”106
TAXES

For the past half century, the Dormant Commerce Clause
rule under National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of
Illinois107—as reaffirmed in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota108—was
that a state could not require a seller to collect sales taxes on
goods and services sold to residents of that state unless the
seller had a physical presence there. In this Term’s South
Dakota v. Wayfair,109 the justices all agreed that Bellas Hess was
wrongly decided. What divided them 5-4 was whether the
Court should do anything about it.
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Led by Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Court concluded
that it should. The case concerned South Dakota’s effort to
require out-of-state sellers to collect sales taxes for goods and
services sold within the state if they annually did business
exceeding $100,000 in South Dakota or engaged in at least 200
separate transactions there. The state sought to compel three
large online retailers to collect sales taxes pursuant to the new
legislation, even though they did not maintain physical presences within the state. Citing Bellas Hess and Quill, the courts
below ruled in favor of the online retailers. Justice Kennedy
and his colleagues in the majority concluded, however, that
Bellas Hess and Quill should be overturned.
The Court reasoned that (among other things) the physicalpresence requirement makes no sense in an era in which so
many economic transactions are conducted over the Internet,
“is a poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by companies
that do business in multiple States,”110 incentivizes sellers to
avoid establishing stores or other potentially desirable presences in multiple states, and amounts to “an extraordinary
imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes
and perform critical public functions.”111 Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that Congress has long had the authority to
reject the physical-presence requirement and that the Court
should be reluctant to overturn its own precedents, but he concluded that “[i]t is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to
ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this
Court’s own creation.”112 The Court said that the lower courts
could determine on remand whether any other Commerce
Clause principle invalidates South Dakota’s tax law, but the
Court also indicated that South Dakota has gone a long way
toward successfully avoiding any discrimination or undueburden concerns. It has done so by exempting out-of-state sellers that do only minimal business in the state, by declaring that
the tax law will not be applied retroactively, and by adopting
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (legislation that,
in a variety of ways, aims to simplify the adopting state’s sales
tax system and thereby reduce the compliance burden).
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court should have left it
to Congress to respond to any problems created by Bellas Hess’s
physical-presence requirement. Chief Justice Roberts noted
that most of the nation’s largest online retailers already collect
sales taxes on behalf of the states in which they make sales.
Forcing the rest of them to do so, he argued, carries pros and
cons that Congress is best equipped to evaluate.

1933. The Court further held that SLUSA does not allow defendants to remove such class actions from state to federal court.
The Court held in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh114 that, when
a district court refuses to certify a proposed class, “a putative
class member [may not], in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing an individual action, commence a
class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable
statute of limitations.”115
In Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co.,116 the Court held that, when trying to determine a
question of foreign law, a federal district court is not rigidly
required to accept as dispositive an official statement submitted by that foreign nation’s government. Rather, a district court
may consider such things as “the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and purpose; the transparency of
the foreign legal system; the role and authority of the entity or
official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency
with the foreign government’s past positions.”117
In Ohio v. American Express Company,118 the 5-4 Court
rejected an antitrust challenge to American Express’s use of
contractual provisions barring merchants from steering their
customers away from using their American Express cards.
LOOKING AHEAD

One can find a continually updated list of cases slated for
the October 2018 Term on the “Merits Cases” page at SCOTUSblog.com. At the time of this writing, perhaps the most
broadly significant civil cases on the Court’s docket involve
disputes about whether small public employers are bound by
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s requirements,119
whether the Court should overrule precedent allowing one
state to be sued in another state’s courts without its consent,120
and whether property owners should continue to be required
to exhaust their state remedies before filing a Fifth Amendment takings claim.121 Given the unfailing ability of human
interaction to produce legal disputes of great import to the rest
of us, that list will surely grow.
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OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS

In Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund,113
the Court held that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 does not take away state courts’ power to adjudicate class actions brought entirely under the Securities Act of
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Transforming 21st
Century Education
William J. Brunson

he National Judicial College (NJC) gathered the foremost
judicial education experts to discuss how the judicial
education field can best educate U.S. trial court judges at
every stage in their careers. Some judges enter the judicial
profession with no specialized education or training about the
judicial role. Yet, society asks these professionals to make
often life-changing decisions during their first days on the job.
During the 2.5-day Transforming 21st Century Judicial Education symposium held at NJC in Reno, Nevada, the experts provided suggestions, engaged in debates, and offered resources.
During the symposium, the participants agreed that a number of paradoxes exist. For instance, core competencies have
been established for court administrators and judicial educators, but no U.S. entity has ever drafted core competencies for
judges. As a result, most U.S. judicial education efforts aren’t
based upon any type of guiding curricula. Rather, most state
judicial education organizations use committees of judges,
who are not professional educators, to select the educational
topics for their annual conferences.
Judge Andre Davis (ret.), a fourth circuit court of appeals
judge and now Baltimore's city solicitor, commented that “our
current judicial education model needs to step into the 21st
Century. No good reason exists for the sporadic nature of judicial education.” Diane Cowdrey, an experienced judicial
branch educator from California, commented that many educational programs around the country would benefit from a
curriculum-based approach to education. “How do we know
that the judge presiding over a case has the educational background and experience to hear the case? When most states
provide one-hour sessions on a variety of subject matters, most
judges lack the in-depth knowledge that our increasingly complex society demands.”
Maureen Conner, professor emerita at Michigan State Uni-

T

versity, former judicial educator for Michigan and Illinois, and
former director for the Judicial Education Reference, Information and Technical Transfer (JERITT) Project and the MSU
Judicial Administration Program, noted that “[m]ost judicial
education in the country relies on the venerable lecture. The
vast majority of presenters don’t have any background or
knowledge about adult education philosophy and practice,
which dramatically and negatively impacts knowledge and
skills retention.”
The Symposium participants identified the educational
needs of all levels of judges, from the judge who has just been
elected or appointed to the experienced judge. The hope is that
this information will assist judicial education efforts across the
country. The participants also highlighted what would help the
judicial education field to progress. Judge Madeleine Landrieu
(ret.), a former Louisiana Court of Appeals judge and now the
dean at Loyola University College of Law, stated, “The judicial
education field is at a cross-roads. In its infancy, judges participated in courses that continuing legal education providers
designed for lawyers. No courses existed to teach judges about
the intricacies of decision making, judicial writing, effective
communication skills, and the myriad of skills that judges
must exercise each day on the bench, in their chambers, and in
the community. Today, while these important courses exist, no
systematic method exists for ensuring that all judges have
access to the individualized learning that they need.”
This Transforming 21st Century Judicial Education Report provides suggestions for further research in three primary areas.
First, the judicial education field needs data regarding who the
new judges are (e.g., age, gender, racial identity, previous experience, etc.). American University published a study in 2004
that gathered and analyzed this data. However, making educational decisions using 14-year-old data is fraught with peril.
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Second, the judicial education field needs a definition of the
core competencies of judges. From this work, judicial education entities can develop curriculum-based judicial education.
As one Symposium commentator said, using a curriculumbased approach will ensure that judicial education entities
avoid using a “flavor-of-the-day” approach to education.
Third, the JERITT Project collected and evaluated trends in
judicial education from 1989 to 2003. Since 2003, no entity
has done that work. As a result, no good data exist for what the
states are doing with regard to judicial education. That information will assist users in defining gaps in providing judicial
education.
This report addresses the funding of state and national
judicial education, how to identify and support judicial education faculty, online learning, and resources for judges and
judicial educators. Next, the report explores how we currently
educate judges and also potential innovations, which may
help improve judicial education. The report discusses the
debate as to whether having mandatory judicial education is a
benefit and suggests the possibility of allowing judges to take
sabbaticals to implement justice improvement projects or
write articles. Finally, the report describes a novel approach
for pursuing court improvement projects that will benefit
both judges and their court systems.
FUNDING OF NATIONAL AND STATE JUDICIAL
EDUCATION

Judicial education budgets are subject to the fluctuations
of state budgets. “Though the national economy is in its seventh year of recovery from the Great Recession, many states
are still facing major funding gaps that have locked legislatures in protracted battles with governors. In some states,
lawmakers have gone into overtime with unresolved budgets,
special sessions and threats of widespread government layoffs. Only 25 states have passed budgets, according to the
National Association of State Budget Officers, which tracks
legislative activity.”1 These budget gaps generally result in
fewer opportunities for national judicial education. They may
also result in restricted programming for in-state courses
such as annual conferences and specialized topics.
To provide educational opportunities when funding is more
restricted, many states are utilizing online learning, primarily
webcasting, to provide additional educational opportunities
for judges and court staff.
Two primary sources of scholarships for judges to attend
national judicial education courses come from the State Justice
Institute (SJI) and the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA). In 2015, SJI’s funding totaled
$5,121,000.2 Of that amount, SJI allocated approximately
$175,000 to its Education Support Program, which amounted
to approximately 3.4% of its funding. Conversely, BJA doesn’t

Footnotes
1. Julie Bosman, States Confront Wide Budget Gaps Even After Years of
Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2015 at A1, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/us/states-confront-widebudget-gaps-even-after-years-of-recovery.html.

make an annual allocation to annual judicial education.
Rather, from 2011 to 2015, BJA allowed NJC to allocate
$514,000 of a total grant amount of $1.2 million to scholarships, or approximately 43%. Today, BJA doesn't allocate any
funds for scholarships.
With these minor federal amounts devoted to national judicial education, judges generally seek funding from their states
or localities. A very small percentage pays for education out of
their own resources.
FACULTY IDENTIFICATION AND SUPPORT

The Symposium participants suggested that identification
of excellent faculty members is a continuing struggle for all
judicial education entities. One potential risk in choosing faculty members, especially for national providers, is choosing
judges or other professionals who are not respected in their
own states. This situation can be alleviated by ensuring that
state judicial educators (SJEs) or chief/presiding judges are
consulted before making faculty selections. Judicial educators
can also identify faculty by noticing new judges who participate in courses and who evidence a passion for education and
knowledge. The educators can then provide support and
encouragement for a future teaching assignment. Other potential instructors can be found in online courses where the SJE
identifies learners who perform particularly well. Most judicial
educators make every effort to diversify their faculties, which
will only improve upon the overall education experiences
because more points of view are represented.
Once faculty members have been identified, they need to
know what their responsibilities are. In other words, SJEs have
to be clear in setting expectations for faculty. They should stress
that teaching adults is a labor-intensive process and a serious
commitment. Unless faculty members are willing to put in adequate preparation time, they should not accept a teaching position. Next, SJEs should make it clear that faculty members are
expected to keep participants’ minds active by using interactive
teaching methods (e.g., quizzes, case studies, debates, learning
games, etc.). They should create learning environments where
their students have the ability to express their knowledge and
experience. However, the use of interactivity should not give
faculty members a license to neglect preparation because they
simply host a large discussion group. This can result in a session where the presenter and students simply share ignorance.
SJEs should ensure their faculty members have access to adult
education information. Faculty should know that the best predictor of learning outcomes is teacher behavior; it even trumps
learner motivation. A presenter who evidences excitement and
passion for the subject matter will ensure greater retention than
the instructor who is obviously unexcited about the subject
matter. If the instructor is uninterested in the subject matter,
how can he or she expect the students to be interested?

2. Update on FY 2016 Appropriations, ST. JUST. INST.,
http://www.sji.gov/update-on-fy-2016-appropriations/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
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In some cases, judges don’t want to teach, but they want to
be involved in the education process. In that case, state judicial
educators can employ those individuals as resource persons
who can assist with the development of lesson plans and the
overall curriculum. Anyone who has a passion for education
should be able to assist in some way. Recognition of both roles
is highly important, so all feel honored for their roles in education. Another possibility is to provide faculty development
such as NJC’s course Designing and Presenting Programs Effectively.3 This course is helpful for any judicial educator who
wants to improve his or her teaching ability.
Most state judicial education programs don’t have the staff
resources to provide individual support to their faculty. Larger
states and national providers may have more of an opportunity
to provide support in developing PowerPoint presentations or
lesson plans. Because the judiciary and topics are constantly in
flux, SJEs and national providers must continually vet new faculty and keep their faculty rosters up-to-date. SJEs also can
pair new faculty with experienced teachers (i.e., set up faculty
mentoring) to assist new faculty members. SJEs should share
the results of any needs assessments with faculty members, so
they know why their topics are needed. Similarly, evaluations
can be fruitful instruments for providing helpful suggestions to
faculty over time.
Removing or working with poorly performing faculty is a
dilemma that all judicial education entities must confront.
This process can be especially difficult in a state where the
poor performing faculty member is chair of the education committee or otherwise wields power over those attempting to
make beneficial changes to educational programming.
The most recent Issues and Trends in Judicial Education noted
that judges comprise 95% of all faculty.4 As judges, they are
extremely busy, full-time employees, so how can they find the
time to prepare for their teaching assignments? Some are quite
skillful at managing their cases with high settlement rates,
which leaves them time to prepare and teach. Others don’t hesitate to work on evenings and weekends because they truly
enjoy creating and delivering presentations. Still others seek
administrative leave when their states allow for it. As more
states embark on online learning, they will find those efforts
can be even more demanding than face-to-face education.
To support volunteer faculty, SJEs should find ways to reward
them for their efforts because they aren’t being paid monetarily.
SJEs should find ways to recognize the faculty for their efforts
with regular positive reinforcement in public, preferably in the
presence of their peers. Another possibility is to provide them
with continuing legal education (CLE) or continuing judicial
education (CJE) credit for their efforts. This would be true
whether they serve as curriculum developers, faculty, or facilita-

tors. SJEs will need to work with their bar CLE/CJE entities to
accomplish the granting of CLE/CJE. SJEs should also consider
providing small token gifts to the faculty. Anything that will
make faculty members feel “special” will work.

3. Designing & Presenting Programs Effectively: A Faculty Development Workshop, NAT’L JUD. C., http://www.judges.org/facultydevelopment-workshop-1510/.
4. CATHARINE M. WHITE & MAUREEN E. CONNER, JUDICIAL EDUC. REFERENCE, INFO. AND TECHNICAL TRANSFER PROJECT, ISSUES AND TRENDS
IN JUDICIAL BRANCH EDUCATION 139 (2005).
5. Interview with Joseph Sawyer (Aug. 14, 2018) (As the online
learning director for the NJC, Mr. Sawyer has been cataloguing

the use of online learning by each state). Please note this list may
not be exhaustive.
6. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFF. PLAN., EVALUATION, AND POL’Y DEV., EVALUATION EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN ONLINE LEARNING: A METAANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF ONLINE LEARNING STUDIES (2010), available at https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/tech/evidence-basedpractices/finalreport.pdf; see also Samuel Riffell & Duncan Sibley,
Using Web-Based Instruction to Improve Large Undergraduate Biol-
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ONLINE LEARNING

Online learning in judicial education has become much
more common in recent years. For instance, in 2017, The
National Judicial College educated 3,800 participants utilizing
the internet. As a comparison, the NJC educated 6,639 participants in face-to-face courses. Accordingly, the NJC educated
more than 36% of its participants via online learning, which
dwarfs the NJC’s early years in online learning. The states of
California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri,
Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Utah, Virginia, and Washington also use online learning
opportunities to supplement their educational offerings.5 Most
of the states are utilizing synchronous web conferences (e.g.,
Adobe Connect, Cisco WebEx, Citrix GoToWebinar, and
Zoom) as their primary online learning platforms, although
more and more states are experimenting with learning management systems. SJEs have reported using the following systems: Bridge, Canvas, Cornerstone, SumTotal Growth Edition,
TraCorp, and Ziiva.
Likewise, some states and national providers are experimenting with blended models of education, which feature faceto-face classes along with synchronous and asynchronous educational opportunities. Some Symposium participants complained participants often won’t participate in online learning
that precedes or follows a face-to-face course because of fear of
technology, lack of knowledge about using technology, scheduling difficulties, apathy, and concern that online learning isn’t
worthwhile, among other reasons.
Despite these concerns, research has shown that blended
learning is superior to face-to-face education or online learning
alone. The United States Department of Education found evidence that blended learning (blending synchronous and asynchronous modalities, or blending the face-to-face classroom
with synchronous and/or asynchronous modalities) is more
effective than face-to-face or online learning by themselves. The
meta-study is “the result of a meta-analysis involving research
published from 1996 to July 2008, in which [the U.S. Department of Education] sifted through more than 1,100 empirical
studies of online learning, 46 of which provided sufficient data
to compute or estimate 51 independent effect sizes,” according
to the report.6 Likewise, Babson Survey Research Group
reported in February 2015, “[t]he percent of academic leaders
rating the learning outcomes in online education as the same or
superior to those in the face-to-face instruction grew from

57.2% in 2003 to 77.0% in 2012.”7 In the same study, the
authors reported, “[t]he proportion of academic leaders who
believe the learning outcomes for online education are inferior
to those of face-to-face instruction remained the same as last
year at 25.9%.”8 Perhaps more importantly, the study showed
“[t]he proportion of academic leaders who report that online
learning is critical to their institution’s long term strategy has
grown from 48.8% to 70.8% this year.”9
While there are very few blended learning courses offered
nationally as of 2018, more U.S. judicial education organizations will begin implementing the blended approach as their
constituencies join the bench with online learning experience.
Many judges still don’t participate in the pre- or post-course
learning opportunities, only participating in the face-to-face
portion of courses. The Symposium participants noted a
potential method of motivating the participants to attend the
entire course. Rather than referring to learning events as pre- or
post-course, it’s important to define those events as “part of the
course.” For instance, a course may include one webcast before
the face-to-face event, one three-day face-to-face event, and
two webcasts after the face-to-face event. These five events
constitute the course. Additionally, it may be fruitful to ask the
judges to “pledge” that they will complete the entire course
(including the webcasts and face-to-face event).

among many others.11 NCSC also acquired the American Judicature Society’s Center for Judicial Ethics. If judges need information on court technology innovations, the best objective source
of information is NCSC. It features an excellent blog curated by
James McMillan and John Matthias located here: https://courttechbulletin.blogspot.com/p/links-and-resources.html.
The National Council for Juvenile and Family Court Judges
has an extensive resource library that contains best practices
for family and juvenile judges to rule on child abuse and
neglect, domestic violence, juvenile justice, and substance
abuse, among many other types of cases.12
Likewise, the NJC has resources for judges including information about capital cases, commercial driver’s licensing laws, mental competency, and sentencing sex offenders, among others.13
For judicial educators, the primary resource is the National
Association of State Judicial Educators (NASJE). NASJE’s website features a newsletter with recent articles discussing how
judicial educators can lead through education, how they can
make changes to their educational systems in a tough economy, and how they can educate about diversity, fairness, and
access.14 The site also showcases resources such as access and
fairness, curriculum designs, essential readings, tech corner, a
link to Thiagi Gameblog (a resources for using learning games
in education), and a link to Judicial Balance, among others.15

RESOURCES FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL EDUCATORS

NEEDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

During the Symposium, the participants identified a number of potential resources that would be helpful for judges. For
instance, it would be helpful for a court system to provide new
judges with a list of judges and their expertise, so the new
judges have someone to contact when they have cases outside
their comfort zones. Likewise, SJEs could benefit from the use
of event apps for their annual conferences. The apps can provide the agenda, sponsor and presenter rosters, presenter
biographies, facility layout, things to do in the conference location, and local weather.
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has a library
of more than 100 topics that judges can access.10 The categories
include access and fairness, courthouse facilities, civil, criminal,
court management, problem-solving courts, and technology,

The Symposium participants identified a number of areas
where more information would be helpful. For instance, no
up-to-date data exist regarding the composition of the U.S.
judiciary (e.g., age, gender, racial identity, previous experience,
etc.). American University published the last study in 2004,
partially utilizing data provided by the American Bench, a
resource that suggests it has data for more than “20,000 judges
in all levels of federal, state and local courts.”16 However,
according to the National Center for State Courts, there are
approximately 28,558 trial and appellate judges in the U.S.17
Consequently, the composition of the judiciary isn’t fully available from that resource. The data from the National Center for
State Courts indicate there are 27,179 trial judges, and 1,379
appellate judges.18 The majority of the states didn’t complete

ogy Courses: An Evaluation of a Hybrid Course Format, 44 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 217 (2005) (finding that online assignments were
just as effective, if not more so, than traditional lectures; and
classroom-based active-learning exercises were more effective
when coupled with online assignments. Instructors of large lecture courses could improve the learning environment by adopting
hybrid course formats).
I. ELAINE ALLEN & JEFF SEAMAN, GRADE LEVEL: TRACKING ONLINE
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Feb. 2015) (The Babson Survey Research Group focuses on higher, graduate, and post-graduate education). The research shows that online learning is effective in general.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L
Information and Resources,
CTR.
ST.
CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources.aspx (last visited
Aug. 10, 2018).
NAT’L
Browse
by
Category,
CTR.
ST.
CTS.,

https://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Browse-byCategory.aspx (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
Resource Library, NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. AND FAM. CT. JUDGES,
http://www.ncjfcj.org/resource-library (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
Resources, NAT’L JUD. C., http://www.judges.org/resources/ (last
visited Aug. 10, 2018).
News, NAT’L ASS’N. ST. JUD. EDUCATORS, http://nasje.org/category/
news/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
NAT’L ASS’N. ST. JUD. EDUCATORS, http://nasje.org/ (last visited Aug.
10, 2018).
The American Bench, FORSTER-LONG, LLC, https://www.forsterlong.com/americanbench (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (advertisement for an annual biographical reference guide to American
judges and courts).
Number of Trial Court Judges, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS.,
http://tinyurl.com/number-trial-ct-judges (last visited Aug. 10,
2018).
Id.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

18.
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the surveys that the National Center for State Courts utilized
in its attempt to identify judges’ race and their ethnicity, and no
questions were asked about previous experience before joining
the bench.19
Likewise, the Symposium participants noted that no information exists about the core competencies of judges. While this
was true at the time of the Symposium, NCSC produced a
report in December 2017. The Elements of Judicial Excellence
framework project provides a “systematic exploration of what
state trial court judges think it takes to be a ‘good judge’ and the
general types of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics they say are important to judicial excellence.” The
resource can be found at https://tinyurl.com/Judicial-Excellence.
From 1991 to 2003, John Hudzik wrote the first issue and
then Maureen Conner wrote later Issues and Trends in Judicial
Education, a biennial publication, which researched, catalogued, and analyzed how each state educated its judiciary.
The research assessed the personnel, budget and finances, programs and services, and organization and governance structures of seven national and as many state judicial branch education organizations that would participate. This information
was extremely helpful for defining the judicial education
efforts of each state. It not only highlighted the content of the
courses, but also how the courses were presented (e.g., defining methods of instruction). No resource currently exists that
provides this research about the ongoing efforts of national and
state judicial education entities.
EDUCATING JUDGES

During the Symposium, the participants discussed not only
the content of what judges need to know, but also how to effectively provide that education and training. To ensure successful
judicial education and training, judicial educators must use
state-of-the-art adult education philosophies and practices.
From performing needs assessments to evaluating courses for
their effectiveness, judicial educators must examine every part
of their work to ensure they are using best practices. Figure One
shows the model for creating judicial education programming.

In honoring adult education practice, judicial educators first
should conduct a needs assessment. The educational need is the
gap or discrepancy between the existing level of knowledge or
skills and the desired level of knowledge or skill. Depending

19. Id.
20. WILLIAM J. BRUNSON, BEST PRACTICES
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USING LEARNING ACTIVI-

upon the course being designed, needs assessment contributors
should include future participants and faculty members and
may include law enforcement, litigants, jurors, witnesses, court
watchers, treatment providers, probation officers, medical treatment professionals, and public agencies (e.g., child care and
support, energy assistance, housing, transportation, food,
financial help, medical, educational and vocational training),
among others. Symposium participants debated whether members of the public should serve in this role. Again, the answer is
largely dependent upon the type of education and training that
the state judicial education organization is developing.
Next, the judicial educator should develop the overall goals
for the course. The goals can answer the following questions:
(1) why are we developing the course?; (2) what are the faculty’s goals?; and (3) what are the participants’ goals? The
goals are usually greater than the course time will allow.
To focus the course, the judicial educator must define
learning objectives that are achievable in the amount of time
devoted to each topic. Learning objectives are learner-centered, measurable or observable, and clear. They define what
the participants will be able to do after the session that they
weren’t able to do before the session. Learning objectives
answer the question of “what’s in it for me?” (the learner).
The Symposium participants noted that all judges, especially
new ones, need an understanding of why they’re doing what
they’re doing. A good educational design will provide those
answers.
Once the judicial educator has defined the learning objectives, he or she can begin to develop the overall course structure and content. Sequencing of topics happens at this stage.
The judicial education professional needs to define how long
the breaks are, whether there is a presenter at lunch, and other
aspects of the course. Is it advisable to show a movie after
lunch? Indeed, what should you serve at lunch to ensure better
student attention? What factor does temperature or room comfort play in learner retention? One very experienced judicial
educator told a story of how he felt his job was to ensure that
the courses and presenters were all exceptional. It was not his
job to be concerned about logistical matters such as lunches,
temperature, hotel rooms, etc. A senior appellate judge kindly
explained to him that without those logistical arrangements
being held in high regard, the learners will remember more
about the cold chicken and the stifling room than they did
about the intricacies of the subject matter that they were learning. In short, a judicial educator needs to concern herself with
the entire experience of the learners, not just the content.
While learning objectives define what the participants will
be able to do differently, learning activities are how the instructor will assist the participants in achieving those objectives.
Types of learning activities include mini-lectures, brainstorming, debates, case studies, large and small group discussions,
learning games, role plays, self-assessments (i.e., quizzes),
videos, and writing exercises, among others.20
Symposium participants discussed the importance of using
a variety of learning activities. For example, an instructor

TIES (Apr. 2018) (checklist on file at the National Judicial College).

could engage the participants in a mock bail hearing to ascertain whether they have grasped the purposes of bail. Likewise,
Symposium participants recommended video recording a twohour trial and building in pauses with questions to answer for
the judicial participants. The students would define how they
would respond to different factual scenarios. For new judges,
this may be the first time that they see the courtroom from the
position of an arbiter, rather than as an advocate.
Some Symposium participants recommended the use of
“retreats” to reinvigorate judges who are very experienced
and/or utilizing those judges as mentors/coaches. Interactive
learning activities or experiential learning opportunities
(ELOs) have the potential to change the paradigm of judicial
education if done well. NJC utilizes a variety of ELOs in its
offerings. For instance, the NJC offers a course in Ashland,
Oregon, in conjunction with the Oregon Shakespeare Festival.
In that course, participants attend the plays and discuss the
ethical dilemmas posed within the plays as those dilemmas
relate to the judiciary.21 Further, the judicial participants read
books to spark in-depth discussions and analyses of ethical
behavior and justice.22 Likewise, NJC’s course When Justice
Fails: Threats to the Independence of the Judiciary asks participants to tour the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. to
help them decipher why the judiciary failed to uphold Germany’s laws in Nazi Germany.23 The participants compare that
failure to modern-day failures of justice.
Quizzes and tests also can improve retention. Many judicial
educators inappropriately believe their learners dislike selfassessments or quizzes. Through its evaluation instruments,
NJC has found that the participants don’t necessarily dislike
assessments if they are truly self-assessments (only to be used
by the learners to self-assess their own knowledge) and not
used by instructors to measure the participant’s success. In
other words, if the educator removes the consequences of a
poor performance, the quiz doesn’t result in displeasure or
antipathy. Researchers found that testing improves retention
rates and that “[r]epeated retrieval induced through testing
(and not repeated encoding during additional study) produces
large positive effects on long-term retention.”24 Quizzes and
tests can be objective or subjective, the latter usually requiring
the participant to draft responses in essays.
Another type of assessment involves personal identification
or definition such as the Implicit Association Test. It “measures
attitudes and beliefs that people may be unwilling or unable to
report.”25 The test is especially important for judges because it
may show they have implicit biases or attitudes that they don’t
know about. “For example, [a judge] may believe that women
and men should be equally associated with science, but [her]
automatic associations could show that [she] (like many others) associate men with science more than [she] associate[s]

women with science.”26 Symposium participants suggested
bias education is extremely important. However, at least one
participant cautioned that identifying the course as a bias or
diversity course will change attitudes and hamper learning. A
better title is the Neuroscience of Decision Making. Some participants suggested it’s important to test biases before the course
to identify the baseline. Next, the presenters would work with
the participants on dismantling biases. Finally, the organizers
would then test participant biases again to ascertain if there has
been improvement.
After the instructors present the course, the judicial educator evaluates the course using an evaluation instrument. The
evaluation instrument should assess whether the learning
objectives have been met in addition to assessing whether the
instructors were effective, clear, and enthusiastic; whether the
presenters’ methods of presentation held the participants’
interest; whether the presenters managed class time well; and
whether the instructional materials were beneficial in learning
the topic. The Symposium participants discussed the best ways
to obtain good data on what participants knew before and after
the content provided. They debated about whether it’s a good
practice to pre- and post-test participants to define whether
measurable learning occurred. Some grant agencies, such as
the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance,
now require such testing to establish that measurable learning
indeed occurred. Symposium participants noted that other
forms of measurement include the observation of performance
rather than cognitive testing. The National Judicial College
uses this approach in its faculty development workshops
where the faculty members assess the teaching skills of the participants on the last day of the workshop. Retention of information is always relevant in determining the success of an educational event.
In assessing educational programs, The National Judicial
College utilizes Kirkpatrick’s Model of Evaluation. The model
has four levels:

21. Ethical
Issues
in
the
Law,
NAT’L
JUD.
C.,
http://www.judges.org/2018courses (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
22. Id.
23. When Justice Fails, NAT’L JUD. C., http://www.judges.org/when-justice-fails-threats-to-the-independence-of-the-judiciary-2017/ (last
visited Aug. 20, 2018).

24. Jeffrey D. Karpicke & Henry L. Roediger III, The Critical Importance of Retrieval for Learning, 319 SCIENCE 966, 968 (Feb. 15,
2008).
25. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
26. Id.

Level 1: Reactions: Did the participants like the program?
Was the material relevant to their work? Use written instruments and/or the provider may utilize focus groups. A levelone evaluation should not just include reactions toward the
overall program (e.g., did you like the program?). It should
also include measurement of the participants’ reactions or attitudes toward specific components of the program, such as the
instructor’s mastery of the topic, learning objectives, the chosen topics, the presentation style, audiovisuals, etc. NJC recommends that (1) program attorneys evaluate directly after the
course; (2) instruments use both close-ended items (rating
scales) and open-ended questions; and (3) rate whether the
course met the overall learning objectives.
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Level 2: Learning: Have the participants learned new skills,
gained knowledge, or changed attitudes? The goal of a leveltwo evaluation is to determine what the participants learned
during the course. Learning outcomes can include changes in
knowledge, skills, or attitudes. Some courses will emphasize
knowledge, some will emphasize skills, some will emphasize
attitudes, and some will emphasize multiple learning outcomes. Educators use objective and subjective tests or quizzes
to assess learning, and performance tests or asking participants
to present subject matters. In addition to tests or quizzes, “it is
also possible to use writing samples, performances, speeches,
and other class-appropriate assessments”27 such as individual
presentations. Educators can measure attitudes with survey
instruments (responding with Likert scale—strongly agree,
agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree) and open-ended
questions.

• Offer more hands-on work right away to ensure student
judges have the opportunity to experience the information,
reflect upon it, theorize broader application, and apply the
information to certain situations, so they can make efficient
decisions.
• Provide opportunities for small-group discussions and
work (i.e., providing participants with problems to solve).
• Utilize team-based learning to encourage additional verbal
processing by learners.
• Use checklists for complex subject matters to ensure all
necessary items are addressed.

Level 3: Transfer: Are the newly acquired skills, knowledge,
or attitudes being used in the everyday environments of the
participants? In a level-three evaluation, the judicial educator
is assessing whether the participants changed their on-thejob-behaviors as a result of their participation in courses. If a
behavior change does not occur, the judicial educator may
want to determine why. In simple terms, a level-three evaluation measures whether the course had a positive effect on participants’ job performance. Educators can measure using a
post-course evaluation (e.g., 3 to 6 months after the course)
to assess what work behavior, if any, the learner has changed
because of the course. Some educators may even utilize court
watchers to assess whether the participants are using their
new skills in the courtroom. Others may survey presiding
judges, subordinates, lawyers, litigants, jurors, and other
court users to ascertain whether the judge has applied any
new techniques.

Many Symposium participants expressed excitement about
the prospect of flipping the classroom (Khan Academy
approach), whereby participants watch lectures via recorded
videos and use classroom time (face-to-face time) for application of principles. The Khan Academy uses technology to track
student progress. Using a virtual dashboard, teachers can
quickly decipher which students are excelling, succeeding, and
falling behind. With this information they can assist struggling
students and use top students to help educate those who are
struggling. “Everyone in the room is working at their own level
and pushing themselves forward at their own pace. By providing lesson scaffolds in various ways, I am able to make sure
that all of my students, regardless of their individualized learning plan goals . . . are working on grade-level standards.”28
Conversely, many Symposium participants argued that flipping the classroom will be difficult, if not impossible, especially considering the audiences at annual conferences. They
reasoned that judges are reluctant or unwilling to work, before
the face-to-face courses or conferences (i.e., unwilling to do
homework). Without repeated prompting, the judges are not
likely to do the homework.

Level 4: Results: Has the education resulted in increased court
efficiency, improved access, decreased costs, increased perceptions of fairness, reduced frequency of problems, etc.?
Research institutions generally conduct this type of long-term
study, which is empirical in nature. Control groups are generally required for validity. Unfortunately, it is difficult to isolate
the effect of the training course because there are usually many
additional causal variables operating on the level four outcome
variables (i.e., the educational event is just one of many potential causes).

Another method for improving retention was flipping the
classroom.
FLIPPING THE CLASSROOM (THE KHAN ACADEMY
APPROACH)

INDIVIDUALIZED LEARNING PLANS OR INDIVIDUAL
EDUCATION PLANS (IEPS)

• Video record judicial presentations so student judges can
review them. Research shows that repetition improves
information retention.

Symposium participants also addressed the importance of
creating or facilitating the creation of individualized learning
plans or individual education plans (IEPs) for judges. The participants expressed interest in having judges complete selfassessment instruments in which the judges would define their
own strengths and weaknesses. The participants thought it
would be beneficial for a person to be designated to review the
individualized education plan with the judge in a confidential
manner. Some thought that mentors/coaches could serve in
that role. Others believed that state judicial educators could
review those plans with the judges, or they could organize an
appropriate pairing with a mentor/coach.

27. Ludmila Praslova, Adaptation of Kirkpatrick’s Four Level Model of
Training Criteria to Assessment of Learning Outcomes and Program
Evaluation in Higher Education, 22 EDUC. ASSESSMENT EVALUATION
& ACCOUNTABILITY 215, 220 (July 2010).

28. Khan Academy Teacher Published in Education Week, KHAN ACAD.,
http://schools.khanacademy.org/post/89390190303/khan-academy-teacher-published-in-education-week (last visited Aug. 20,
2018) (teacher testimonial) (emphasis added).

IMPROVING RETENTION RATES

The Symposium participants noted the following methods
of improving retention rates:
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States have varied resources for brand new judges. Some
judges have access to a tremendous number of resources. Others don’t have access to much. Nevertheless, if a national
instrument was created, it would help all states address the
varied educational needs of their judges. Some of the Symposium participants expressed that it would be a best practice to
assign new judges to a limited jurisdiction first (if possible) so
they can transition into their new roles with greater ease. The
IEP would provide more detailed information about best
assignments for easing judges, whether experienced or not,
into their new roles.
MENTORING AND COACHING

The majority of Symposium participants supported the idea
of using mentors/coaches to assist judges, especially new ones.
A number of judicial education entities utilize mentoring to
supplement their judicial education efforts. For example,
Florida has had a formal mentoring program for judges since
1991.29 In that program, the courts pair newly elected and
appointed trial court judges with more experienced members
of the judiciary.30 The purpose of the program is to “make the
transition from the bar to the bench as seamless as possible.”31
It provides judges with access to critical information, court
resources, and one-to-one guidance for judges immediately
upon their taking the bench.32 In New York, they utilize judicial hearing officers (JHO), who are retired judges, as mentors.
The JHOs worked without pay when the JHO program was
suspended for monetary reasons. In Maryland, new trial judges
are assigned to a mentoring program. “The purpose of the New
Trial Judge Mentoring Program . . . is to assist New Trial Judges
in the transition from attorney to judge and provide support to
the New Trial Judges prior to and following the mandatory
New Trial Judges’ Judicial Education Program.”33
Dr. Maureen Conner and William Anderson identify the elements of mentoring as follows:
1) [M]entoring is a professional work-related relationship, 2) between an older more experienced member of a
profession or organization, and 3) a lesser-experienced
newcomer, 4) where the senior member offers advice and
guidance designed to enhance the newcomer’s skill
development and socialization within the profession or
organization.34
One likely result of mentoring is to provide collegial support
to new judges, so they can alleviate the stress of the new role.35
A smaller number of states also utilize coaching to improve
judicial performance. For instance, Massachusetts instituted

29. See Mentoring, FLORIDA CTS., http://www.flcourts.org/publications
-reports-stats/judiciary-education/mentoring.stml (last visited
Aug. 20, 2018).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland Administrative Order on Orientation and Mentoring for New Trial Judges, MARYLAND CTS,
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders/

TABLE 1
FOCUS

MENTORING

COACHING

Definition
and Focus

A more informal association focused on building a two-way, mutually
beneficial relationship
for long-term career
movement.

A more formal structured association
focused on improvements in behavior and
performance to resolve
present work issues or
handle specific aspects
of the job.

Role

Talking with a person
who has identified his
needs before entering
into a mentoring relationship. The emphasis
is on active listening,
providing information,
making suggestions,
and establishing connections.

Talking to a person,
identifying what he
needs, and developing
an action plan. The
emphasis is on instruction, assessing, and
monitoring.

Approach

This is a self-directed
modus operandi
whereby participants
have choices. This
approach can begin
with a self-matching
process and continue
throughout the relationship using a committed
timeline to determine
how often and where
individuals will meet,
identify goals, and so
forth.

A structured modus
operandi is more frequently used whereby
participants are working within a narrower
perspective; their
agenda is more specific,
shorter in duration, and
oriented toward certain
results. Usually a coach
is assigned to an
employee.

Tools

The most important
tool is the Mentoring
Agreement—developed,
completed, and signed
by both participants.
This document formalizes commitment to the
mentoring relationship.
Items include individual goals, learning content, a meeting schedule, and communication methods.

Depending on the individual situation, various
assessment instruments
can be used such as
skills-training activities
and teaching evaluations. A contract can be
issued regarding the
problem to be resolved
or skills to be learned.

20160825orientationmentoringnewtrialjudges.pdf (last visited
Aug. 20, 2018).
34. MAUREEN E. CONNER & WILLIAM A. ANDERSON, JUDICIAL EDUC. REFERENCE, INFO. AND TECHNICAL TRANSFER PROJECT, MENTORING IN THE
JUDICIARY 5 (2d ed. 2005), available at http://cj.msu.edu/
assets/JERITT-Monograph-2-Mentoring-in-the-Judiciary.pdf.
35. See Celeste Bremer, Reducing Judicial Stress Through Mentoring, 87
JUDICATURE 244, 245 (Mar.–Apr. 2004).
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the J2J Program, which is a collaborative, judge-to-judge peermentor coaching program.36 While mentoring and coaching
have many similar characteristics, they also have differences as
outlined in Table 1.37
Working with the judicial education division in Massachusetts, Jan and Steve Bouch designed the coaching/mentoring
program to build and grow the individual capacity of judges
to provide justice.38 J2J assists in “transitioning newlyappointed judges to the bench and integrating them into the
judicial system, acts as a resource to address performance
issues, and is an ongoing network of care and support for
judges throughout their careers.”39 The program provided
structure for inculcating a mentoring and coaching culture. To
attract talented mentors and coaches, the founders provided a
great deal of positive reinforcement and made it an honor to
be selected as a mentor and coach. They selected respected
retired judges as the mentors/coaches. They also provided
education and training on how to successfully perform as
mentors/coaches. Finally, they gave new judges (the protégés)
the ability to choose their mentors/coaches because an
improper pairing will result in disassociation.
At the outset of the relationship, mentors/coaches contacted new judges by email to welcome and let them know
they can contact them any time for questions. The coaches
also had access to standardized information about what to
expect when transitioning to the bench (logistics, family
issues, etc.). In some cases, J2J supplied subject-matter expert
mentors/coaches to assist new judges with regard to specialized topics.
For marketing a coaching or mentoring program, Symposium participants suggested that if the state establishes a
mentoring or coaching program as something elite, then people will want to do it. They also opined that many retired
judges want to feel useful and participating in a mentoring or
coaching program can give them that opportunity. Some
courts have used something as simple as a special pin, which
identifies the judge as one of the elite few that is available to
mentor new judges. The pin evidences that the judge has this
“elite” status.
In the medical field, some hospitals are experimenting with
Project ECHO. Project ECHO is a lifelong learning and guidedpractice model to assist in educating medical professionals and
increase workforce capacity to provide best-practice specialty
care and reduce health disparities.40 The ECHO model is a
hub-and-spoke knowledge-sharing network, led by expert
teams (the hub) who use multi-point videoconferencing to
conduct clinics with community providers (the spokes).41 Project ECHO solves two significant issues. First, it provides spe-

cialist advice because there aren’t enough specialists, especially
in rural and underserved communities.42 Second, ECHO trains
primary care clinicians to provide specialty care services themselves where necessary.43 The specialists provide mentoring
and feedback to primary care clinicians, who become part of a
learning community.44
In the judicial arena, judges with particularly difficult cases
could reach out to fellow judges who have specialized expertise with the type of case in issue. The judicial educators’ role
would be to provide linkages between “judicial specialists” and
the judges who need that expertise. A possible technological
approach would be the use of a listserv to discuss particularly
difficult cases. Another approach would be to utilize old cases
to present problems to learner judges. How would you resolve
the case? Some state ethics rules may require the judge who
receives assistance to disclose the consultation, depending
upon how and when it occurs.
Some Symposium participants recommended the use of
shadowing. In this process, new judges would sit with experienced judges on the bench. The new judge would observe
what the experienced judge does. Judicial educators could also
educate experienced judges about how to debrief these shadowing sessions, so the new judge has an opportunity to process
the information more fully. Alternatively, experienced judges
can shadow or watch new judges as they conduct hearings to
provide advice. Obviously, some issues require instantaneous
decisions, so new judges will make mistakes as part of the
learning process. However, there is a potential technological
solution: The senior or experienced judge could have an iPad
or tablet to transmit thoughts privately to the new judge.
(NOTE: This approach may have ethical implications depending upon the jurisdiction.)

36. COMMW. MASS., SUP. JUD. CT., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM FY2013 4 (2014), available at
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/208607.
37. Annabelle Reitman & Sylvia Benatti, Mentoring Versus Coaching:
What’s the Difference?, ASS’N FOR TALENT DEV. (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.td.org/insights/mentoring-versus-coaching-whatsthe-difference (last visited on Dec. 4, 2015).
38. See JUST. COACHING CENTER, https://justicecoachingcenter.com/
(last visited Aug. 20, 2018).

39. COMMW. OF MASS., SUP. JUD. CT., supra note 36.
40. Project ECHO, U.N.M. SCH. OF MED., https://echo.unm.edu/ (last
visited Dec. 7, 2015).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Katrina Pugh & Laurence Prusak, Designing Effective Knowledge
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USE OF KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS

To help in the design of judicial branch education, a summit participant suggested the creation of knowledge networks.
Knowledge networks are “collections of individuals and teams
who come together across organizational, spatial and disciplinary boundaries to invent and share a body of knowledge. The
focus of such networks is usually on developing, distributing
and applying knowledge.”45 In the context of judicial education, a potential network could include judges of all types and
levels, attorneys, and court staff. Depending upon the nature of
the education, other knowledge network contributors could
include law enforcement, litigants, jurors, witnesses, court
watchers, treatment providers, probation officers, medical
treatment professionals, and public agencies (e.g., child care
and support, energy assistance, housing, transportation, food,

financial help, medical, educational and vocational training),
among others.
EMPATHY FOR JUDGES

A symposium participant advocated teaching pain empathy
to judges. Because many criminal defendants are responding to
the pain of depression, drug withdrawal, abusive relationships,
and other difficult life circumstances, judges should use empathy in their decision making. In this way, they can fashion the
most appropriate sentence. Professor Rebecca Lee defines
empathy as follows:
[T]he action of taking the perspective of another by
conceptually placing oneself in another’s position—to
better understand what the other person is thinking and
feeling. Empathy encourages both cognitive and emotional understanding of others with different experiences, identities, and worldviews. It entails attempting to
better understand all sides to a dispute, with care taken
to understand the side with less power and less similarity vis-à-vis the adjudicator, to ensure that all sides are
given full consideration. Empathy matters for judging
because judges must expressly and consciously take into
account the full positions of the parties, from where the
parties stand, to avoid making unconscious and biased
judgments.46

cian empathy before they had been trained.51 The researchers
educated half of the residents using a series of three training
modules about the neurobiology and physiology of empathy
and emotions.52 The other half received the usual residency
training. Patients rated the trained residents significantly
higher on providing compassionate care.53 Most people believe
empathy is an inborn trait that cannot be learned, but the
researchers found that empathy can, in fact, be taught:
Residents learned to sit down, make meaningful eye
contact, and listen better. Trained physicians also maintained professionalism and compassion even when
patients were demanding or using manipulative tactics.
They became more aware of the underlying vulnerability
of their patients’ surface behaviors and more able to manage their own emotions.54
Education for judges on empathy is likewise possible.
MOTIVATING ATTENDANCE AT EDUCATIONAL EVENTS

Professor Lee suggests that empathy is especially important
in cases where the judges “are differently situated from the parties in terms of life opportunities and societal expectations.”47
For example, if a criminal defendant faces the prospect of a
jail sentence for the first time, it is a frightening proposition.
That potential sentence causes tremendous anguish. However,
if the defendant is a “frequent flier” (that is, he or she has been
incarcerated on a number of occasions), the prospect of jail
time doesn’t cause anguish because (1) the offender has
learned to cope, and (2) the offender may have friends in jail.
Critics of this viewpoint suggest that empathetic judging is
emotional and irrational judging, which will lead to favoritism
for one side or another.48 However, Professor Lee argues that
“empathizing is necessary to deal with any unconscious bias
that a judge may hold against the litigant she least identifies
with.”49 To maintain objectivity in adjudicating cases, judges
must empathize with the parties to fully consider their views.50
Teaching empathy is possible. In a research study involving
resident physicians, researchers asked patients to rate physi-

Symposium participants discussed the best ways to attract
attendance at educational events, especially for those states
where attendance is voluntary. They agreed that improving instate educational events by utilizing adult education best practices was the best way to encourage attendance because learning is much more enjoyable. Some Symposium participants
recommended allowing participants to “test-out” of courses,
thereby ensuring they were only taking those courses that
would be beneficial for them.
Symposium participants also encouraged judicial education organizations to award certificates for the mastery of subject matters. This would create an incentive-based system that
would motivate many learners. In this model, state judicial
educators would develop curricula that would take multiple
years of annual conferences to complete with emphasis on different disciplines (e.g., criminal, civil, family, etc.), especially
in those states where judges are assigned to specialized dockets as opposed to being general jurisdiction.55 It’s possible that
the state bar could provide incentives such as scholarships to
attend national courses in support of the specialized discipline. Another motivator may be to encourage the judge to
teach the subject matter that he or she has mastered. For those
judges in elected states, the judge could potentially announce
the attainment of the certification, which would likely assist
in reelection.
For those suffering from burnout (which can result from

Networks, MITSLOAN, Fall 2013, available at https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/designing-effective-knowledge-networks/.
Rebecca K. Lee, Judging Judges: Empathy as the Litmus Test for
Impartiality, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 205 (2014) [hereinafter Judging Judges]. See also Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944 (2012); and Emily Jane Goodman, The
Importance of Judicial Empathy, THE NATION (Aug. 5, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/importance-judicial-empathy
(last visited on Aug. 20, 2018).
Judging Judges, supra note 46, at 205.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149.

50. Id. at 148.
51. Helen Riess, Can Empathy Be Taught?, MEDSCAPE (Feb. 1, 2013),
available at https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/778463.
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. Some Symposium participants advocated the use of breakout sessions at annual conferences devoted to the different experience
levels of judges (e.g., new, mid-career, and seasoned judges).
Because of the resources necessary to accomplish this and because
of audience size issues, only relatively large jurisdictions can
accomplish this.

46.

47.
48.
49.
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boredom due to years of experience, from judicial stress, or from
vicarious trauma), some Symposium participants recommended
the offering of esoteric classes and topics to reinvigorate those
judges. Some examples at the national level include Today’s Justice: The Historical Basis of American Law, Judicial Philosophy and
American Law, Ethical Issues in the Law: A Novel Approach, When
Justice Fails: Threats to the independence of the Judiciary, and Current Issues in the Law. Each of these National Judicial College
courses allows judges to reexamine or get in touch with why
they became judges in the first place. They are also offered in
locations that are conducive to a more retreat-like experience.
CREATING A “CULTURE OF LEARNING”

Symposium participants suggested that judicial education
providers would benefit from the creation of a “culture of
learning.” Private industry provides an excellent definition of
a learning culture. It is a “set of organizational values, conventions, processes, and practices that encourage individuals –
and the organization as a whole – to increase knowledge, competence, and performance.”56 In courts, not only do judges
need education throughout their careers, but all court staff
require education as well. Most state judicial education offices
provide education and training for judges and court staff and
are excellent at inculcating learning cultures.
Another way to describe a learning culture is to suggest the
importance of lifelong learning. All professionals, especially
judges, will only grow and provide excellent service to the justice system if they engage in lifelong learning. As academician
Peter Jarvis writes, “learning underlies our humanity: humans
learn because we are consciously alive and that our learning is
not only cognitive but all that makes us human beings which
is added to our bare animal existence is learned. In this sense,
learning must be life long.”57
In a learning culture, Symposium participants commented
that widening the knowledge field is important for all judges.
That is, judges should not only be concerned with topics such
as evidence, courtroom procedures, updates to statutory and
case law, etc., they should also seek out education that
addresses economics, history, medicine, sociology, psychology,
and more esoteric topics that may not have immediate applicability. While new judges are most likely to appreciate information from judges, more experienced judges (e.g., intermediate to experienced judges) are more likely to want to receive
education from other professionals because they have mastered
the basic knowledge of the profession. Professionals who have
taught at the National Judicial College include accountants,
court administrators, law professors, lawyers, journalists,
physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, researchers, treatment
providers, university professors, among other disciplines.

56. Seven Steps to Building a High-Impact Learning Culture, ORACLE,
http://www.oracle.com/us/chro-docs/june-2013-chro-deck41961622.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
57. PETER JARVIS, DEMOCRACY, LIFELONG LEARNING AND THE LEARNING
SOCIETY: ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN A LATE MODERN AGE 3 (2008)
(emphasis added).
58. James Reardon, Janice Payan, Chip Miller & Joe Alexander, Optimal Class Length in Marketing Undergraduate Classes: An Exami-
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OPTIMUM CLASS LENGTH FOR RETAINING LEARNERS’
ATTENTION

Symposium participants discussed methods of improving
in-state educational events: Some judicial educators are
reviewing their education practice of providing longer sessions
(e.g., 1.5 to 2 hours) instead of one-hour sessions. Many SJEs
utilize a format of 90-minute sessions, not because of
improved attention, but because of the financial inability to
provide refreshments during the breaks. Conversely, some SJEs
recommend one hour maximum for sessions because of attention-span issues. Further, some report that their learners who
are generally in their 50s or older report that more breaks are
needed for physical reasons.
No researchers have conducted empirical studies to determine the best lengths of courses for older learners. Indeed, the
vast majority of studies about learning and retention involve
learners who are 18 to 22 years old (i.e., college age) or
younger. Researchers in a study of college students reviewed
the preferences of students between three class formats (i.e., 1
hour/three times a week, 1.5 hours/twice a week, or 3
hours/one time a week).58 The researchers wanted to know
which format was optimal “in terms of student (a) perspectives, (b) grades, and (c) evaluations of instructor performance.”59 They found that regardless of major, students preferred the twice a week, 1.5-hour format. “Student performance in the [three-hour] class format was the lowest, and student performance in the [one-hour] class format was found to
be slightly better.”60
While researchers may be able to replicate this study for
older learners, it’s not likely they will find a measurable difference in retention rates between 1 and 1.5 hours of instruction.
It’s more likely that the method of instruction (e.g., using a variety of learning activities in addition to lecture) will be more
significant than the amount of time in class.
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CURRENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES

Symposium participants recommended that judicial educators engage participants in discussions about how judicial policies and practices in the judiciary can be improved. In other
words, how can those in the judiciary improve case outcomes,
fairness, perceptions of fairness, etc.? They also suggested the
use of a problem-centric approach. Some Symposium participants recommended weaving ethics, bias, access to justice, and
fairness issues into every topic taught. Also, one of the participants stated there are some subjects that require metacognition. The Oxford English Dictionary defines metacognition as
"[a]wareness and understanding of one's own thought
processes."61

nation of Preference, Instructor Evaluations, and Student Performance, 30 J. MARKETING EDUC. 12, 19 (Apr. 2008).
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Metacognition, Oxford English Dictionary, https://en.oxford
dictionaries.com/definition/metacognition (last visited Aug. 20,
2018).

The participant suggested that utilizing procedural fairness
techniques would be considered a form of metacognition.
Quoting psychology Professor Tom Tyler, Judges Kevin Burke
and Steven Leben suggest four basic expectations that encompass procedural fairness:
1. Voice: the ability to participate in the case by expressing their viewpoint;
2. Neutrality: consistently applied legal principles, unbiased decision makers, and a “transparency” about how
decisions are made;
3. Respectful treatment: individuals are treated with dignity and their rights are obviously protected;
4. Trustworthy authorities: authorities are benevolent,
caring, and sincerely trying to help the litigants; this
trust is garnered by listening to individuals and by
explaining or justifying decisions that address the litigants’ needs.62
The National Judicial College, for example, added procedural fairness as a topic in its two-week General Jurisdiction, a
course for judges with zero to three years of experience. Likewise, the NJC includes the subject matter in its self-study,
online course for judges who have been appointed or elected
to the bench but not have yet taken the bench. Procedural fairness is a bedrock of the NJC’s judicial education programming
for new judges.

need the education don’t come to it. If they continue to participate, they can’t help but be improved in the process.
A similar question involves mandating an area of judicial
education such as ethics or fairness education. Many judges
believe they have expertise in ethics and fairness education, so
they don’t need it. However, they may be subject to the Dunning–Kruger effect. It holds that “poor performers are often
not in a position to recognize the depths of their deficits, no
matter how honestly, impartially, or eagerly they strive for
accurate self-assessments.”63 Requiring the education would
alleviate the effect.
A Symposium participant postulated that how judges are
treated may be part of the problem if education is not mandated. That is, no one has the ability to require judges (who
truly need education) to go to judicial courses if it’s not mandated by statute or rule.
Conversely, one participant, who opposed mandating education, felt it would be possible to educate brand new judges
about the importance of lifelong education so long as the new
judges received that message within six months of appointment or election. Another thought that if supreme court justices improved their attitudes toward education or increased
their attendance at educational events, it would improve the
perceptions of lower-level court judges toward judicial education. Consequently, mandating education would not be necessary. Still another thought that if apathetic judges are part of
the planning process, buy-in from those judges would be
greater for attendance.

SHOULD WE HAVE MANDATORY JUDICIAL
EDUCATION?

JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS

The Symposium participants could not reach consensus on
whether education and training for judges should be mandatory. Some believe mandatory education doesn’t really impact
the 8 to 10% of judges who are educationally apathetic or have
retired in place. Apathy makes education impossible. Further,
no evidence exists that mandatory education improves outcomes or that it makes better judges. Mandatory education fills
the room with a percentage of detractors who will lessen the
experience for all.
Conversely, some believe having those judges participate is
important even if they may be disruptive to the educational
process. The apathetic judges can’t help but to gain something
by the experience, even though the judges may deny it. From
a public perception standpoint, the public deserves judges who
are lifelong learners. Likewise, mandatory judicial education
improves the public perception of the courts because the public feels it’s getting judges who continue to educate themselves.
If there was no requirement that we pay taxes, would we? Nevertheless, we all know that paying taxes makes for a better
society. Likewise, we should require judicial education because
it makes the majority better. They argue the judges who most

Researchers have defined occupational burnout as the
“physical and emotional stress stemming from occupational
factors.”64 Burnout “may negatively affect a judge’s ability to
consider relevant evidence.” Symposium participants noted
that many judges experience burnout after years on the bench.
“Anxiety stemming from occupational responsibilities can be
remedied by an occasional break from work. Even an extra day
off to engage in a favorite hobby can help a judge come back
to the bench refreshed and relaxed. Longer-term sabbaticals
should also be encouraged from time to time to allow judges to
get away for a few weeks or months.”65
In an effort to ensure state judiciaries don’t lose experienced
jurists, the participants recommended a number of potential
solutions. First, they suggested that the judge should be
allowed to leave the work of day-to-day judging to engage in
the development of a project that will improve the system in
some way. Alternatively, the judge could write an article to
impart gained wisdom.
Symposium participants felt freeing the judge for a period of
time from the day-to-day work would be possible without legislative authority. To ensure the public’s support of the oppor-

62. Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 COURT REV. 4, 6 (2007–08) (citing
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 22–23 (2006)).
63. Oliver J. Sheldon, Daniel R. Ames & David Dunning, Emotionally
Unskilled, Unaware, and Uninterested in Learning More: Reactions
to Feedback about Deficits in Emotional Intelligence, 99 J. APPLIED

PSYCHOL. 125, 126 (2014).
64. Jared Chamberlain & Monica K. Miller, Evidence of Secondary
Traumatic Stress, Safety Concerns, and Burnout Among a Homogeneous Group of Judges in a Single Jurisdiction, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 214 (2009).
65. Id. at 221.
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tunity, benchmarks for the time frame and project would be
helpful. Indeed, drug courts started because of the sabbatical of
one judge in Florida taking a break to look at the problem of
drugs. To market the Justice System Improvement Project to
judges, it would ask the judges to leave a legacy, to remember
the passion and why the person became a judge in the first
place, and to implore the judges to share the wisdom they have
obtained from many years on the bench.

William Brunson is director of special projects
for the National Judicial College. In this position, he is responsible for business development,
conducts faculty development workshops, manages international programs, and oversees
numerous grant projects primarily related to
curriculum development for judges. He has been
with the College since 1992. Mr. Brunson
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National Judicial College’s Approach to Distance Learning:
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What Judges Need to Know” (2013); “Immigration Consequences
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Answers to Crossword
from page 147

EFFECTIVE ADJUDICATION OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES
The American Judges Association, with the assistance of Futures Without Violence,
and the National Center for State Courts, is proud to provide this high quality, webbased, comprehensive domestic violence education for judges. Using adult-learning
instruction tools and interactive exercises, separate training modules on key issues
allow new and experienced judges to learn at their own pace from leading national
experts they might not otherwise have the time, opportunity or funding to see. The
AJA offers this timely, engaging and convenient resource at no cost to judges who
want to apply this state of the art learning to make our communities safer.
Visit http://education.amjudges.org to learn more.
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The checklist below can be found on http://www.judicialfamilyinstitute.org. The checklist suggests some
ways to be thoughtful about your security, and the security of your family.
For further information about keeping yourself and your family members safe at home and online, see:
http://www.judicialfamilyinstitute.org/Topics-and-Programs/Security.aspx.

Court Review - Volume 54 141

Easing the Road to Civil Justice:
Improving Litigants’ Awareness of ADR Options
Donna Shestowsky

I

n an overburdened justice system, litigants often wade
through years of court proceedings and incur significant
expenses as they seek civil justice. In many instances, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures can offer litigants
relief from the expense and waiting time associated with trial.
In addition, compared to trials, ADR options often allow litigants to resolve their disputes in ways that better meet their
objectives. For example, ADR permits litigants to set aside the
rule of law in the interest of shared goals or industry norms.
Further, court-sponsored ADR can increase the efficiency of the
judicial system. When litigants are satisfied with their dispute
resolution experience, they are more likely to voluntarily comply with the outcome.1 This compliance can mean fewer
breach-of-contract claims stemming from settlement agreements and fewer appeals. However, court ADR programs cannot realize these benefits if litigants are unaware of their existence. To assess litigant awareness of court ADR offerings, I
conducted a survey study of litigants across three state courts. I
review the rather sobering findings, and then discuss specific
actions that courts and lawyers can take to improve litigants’
awareness of such programs.

responses as “yes,” “no,” or “don’t know.” For all participants,
the correct response to both questions was “yes.”
Using information collected from the surveys, we categorized litigants based on both representation status and repeat
experience with litigation. Specifically, litigants were classified
as (1) “represented” if they had a lawyer or were themselves a
lawyer or “unrepresented” if they did not have a lawyer and
were not themselves a lawyer, and (2) “repeat player” if they
had been a plaintiff or defendant in a prior case or “first-time
litigant” if they had no past experience as a party.
MAIN FINDINGS

The survey data revealed several novel and surprising results:
• Only about 25% of litigants were aware of their court’s mediation program and only about 27% were aware of their court’s
arbitration program. See Figures 1 and 2.

METHODOLOGY

My research team and I collected data from 336 litigants eligible for their court’s mediation and arbitration programs to
determine whether they were aware of these offerings. Litigants
were surveyed by phone within three weeks of their cases being
closed. Participants were selected from three state courts: the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah; the Superior
Court of California, County of Solano; and the Fourth Judicial
District, Multnomah County, Oregon. These courts were chosen because they offer both mediation and non-binding arbitration (in addition to trial) for the same causes of action. Only
cases eligible for both procedures were eligible for the study.
The resulting sample includes litigants involved in a wide range
of cases, including property, personal injury, contracts, and
medical malpractice.
We asked litigants to rate their impression of their court
(“On a scale from 1 to 9 where 1 = extremely negative, 9 =
extremely positive, and 5 = right in the middle, neutral, what is
your impression of the court where this case was filed?”). Litigants also listed the procedures that they or their lawyer had
considered using for their case (“Before you started thinking
about what procedure was best for your case, you or your
lawyer probably thought about all the possible ways that could
resolve your case. What are all the procedures you or your
lawyer considered?”). In addition, we asked whether their court
offered a mediation or arbitration program. We classified

Footnotes
1. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 82 (2d ed. 2006).
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• Only 15% of participants identified both programs at their
court.
• Represented litigants were no more likely than unrepresented parties to correctly identify their court’s programs.
• Litigants who knew their court offered mediation were
more likely to think highly of their court. However, this
was not the case for arbitration.
• Compared to first-time litigants, repeat players were less
likely to exhibit confusion about whether their court

offered mediation (the ratio of “don’t know” to “yes”
replies was 2.2 times higher among first-timers than
among repeat players) and arbitration (the ratio was 2.53
higher among first-timers than among repeat players).
• Less than one-third of litigants reported that they or their
lawyer had considered using mediation or arbitration.
Negotiation was the most commonly contemplated procedure, followed by trial. The judicial settlement conference
was the procedure least likely to be considered. Nearly
16% indicated that they had contemplated “other” courses
of action, most typically filing a countersuit or bankruptcy.
• Litigants who knew their court offered mediation were
not more likely to consider using mediation than those
who thought it did not. In contrast, litigants who knew
their court offered arbitration were 2.6 times more likely
to consider using that procedure than those who were
unaware of this possibility, suggesting that the court’s
stamp of approval boosted the odds that litigants would
consider arbitration.
Additional research should explore why litigants are unable
to identify their courts’ ADR offerings. The level of unawareness we observed may be the result of litigants never learning
about their courts’ programs. Research on memory offers
another possible explanation: Litigants may have received
material about their court’s ADR offerings but been unable to
recall this information at the time of the survey, which they
completed after the conclusion of their cases. Studies have
shown that mere exposure to information is not enough to
guarantee learning. 2 To learn and retain information, people
often need to engage in a deep form of processing called “elaboration.” Elaboration involves associating new information
with knowledge already recorded in long-term memory, thus
incorporating the new information into a broader familiar narrative.3 If litigants heard about mediation or arbitration in
passing and had superficial conversations (not tailored to their
situation) about the procedures with their lawyers, the information may not have been committed to long-term memory.
IMPROVING LITIGANT AWARENESS OF COURT ADR

Regardless of the reasons for their lack of awareness, when
litigants do not know their options, they cannot make informed
decisions about how to resolve their disputes. Our findings suggest several ways that both courts and attorneys can better educate litigants about available procedures. The following sections
outline several possibilities.

2. See JOHN R. ANDERSON, LEARNING AND MEMORY: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH 161-63; 204-10 (1st ed., 1995); DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY 345-46 (7th ed. 2004).
3. ANDERSON, supra note 2 at 204-10 (1995) (outlining how deep
processing can be achieved by placing the material into context
for the person trying to learn the material, relating it to material
that the person already knows, and helping the person understand why the material is personally relevant).
4. Donna Shestowsky, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: An Empirical Study
of Litigants’ Awareness of Court-Sponsored Alternative Dispute Reso-

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COURTS

1. Courts can institute rules that require attorneys to discuss
ADR with their clients.4 Ideally, these rules would encourage
lawyers to start these discussions early in the litigation
process and revisit them at various points as a case develops.
Because prior research suggests that rules requiring lawyers
to discuss ADR with their clients are not always effective,5
courts should implement additional measures to ensure the
enforcement of these rules. For example, they could require
both attorneys and litigants to sign a disclosure form indicating that the attorney has reviewed both private and courtsponsored ADR options for the case. Some courts, such as
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, already do this. Courts could also impose penalties on
attorneys who do not comply with the rules.
2. Courts can directly provide litigant education by giving litigants educational materials about their programs (and ADR in
general), without expecting lawyers to act as intermediaries.
Courts could reap benefits from this course of action: we
found that litigants who were aware that their courts offered
mediation had more favorable impressions of the court.
3. Courts can create attorney-staffed help desks to answer
questions about ADR procedures.6
4. Courts can hold periodic in-person, judge-facilitated ADR
informational meetings. Having authority figures such as
judges hold these sessions may make litigants and lawyers
more willing to fully consider the information.7
5. Courts should remind litigants about their ADR options at
several points in time while their cases are pending. Psychological research suggests that reminders that are salient to
the particular litigant are likely to be particularly effective
education tools. For example, litigants might be more likely
to remember information about ADR if they are reminded
about their options after they lose a Motion for Summary
Judgement.
6. Some courts already use exit surveys to assess litigant satisfaction with ADR procedures after litigants have used
them. Courts should also survey parties who did not use
these programs, to learn why. To the extent that litigants
are aware of these programs but do not use them, courts
should explore how they can make their programs more
appealing and dismantle any institutional or systemic barriers. If courts discover (as we did) that many litigants are
not aware of their programs, they should obtain feedback
from litigants (and lawyers) to determine how to better
advertise them.
Although these measures may seem like extra work for a

lution Programs, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 224-225, 234-235 (2017).
5. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on
the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 MO. L. REV.
473 (2002).
6. Jerome B. Simandle, Enhancing Access to ADR for Unrepresented
Litigants: Federal Court Programs Provide Models for Helping Pro Se
Parties — and the Justice System, DISP. RESOL. MAG.. Spring 2016 at
7, 8.
7. Shestowsky, supra note 4, at 227.
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system designed in part to lighten the workload of the courts,
our research suggests notable benefits. First, these efforts
might encourage litigants to consider using programs in which
courts have already invested, which might ease overburdened
court dockets. Second, such efforts may improve litigants’
impressions of the court. Third, to the extent that, for some litigants, access to ADR is the only reasonable pathway to justice,
improved awareness of these alternatives to trial is paramount.
Although the changes I recommend for courts are important,
attorneys also have a crucial role to play in increasing awareness of ADR procedures.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS

1. Lawyers should be better educated about ADR. Roselle
Wissler found that one major impediment to lawyer-client
conversations about ADR is attorneys’ lack of knowledge
about such procedures.8 To rectify this situation, skills-based
education focused on ADR procedures should be a mandatory part of law school, and attorneys should further hone
their advocacy skills in ADR contexts through CLE programs.
2. Lawyers should receive training on how to counsel clients
about ADR in ways that will facilitate the retention of information over time. To promote elaboration and memory recall,
lawyers should emphasize how the advantages and disadvantages of ADR procedures relate to litigants’ goals and values.
Further, lawyers should ensure that clients know they have
the power to participate in decisions regarding which dispute
resolution procedure will be used (limited by any court rules
and the need for consent from the other party).
3. Even if not required by local rules or the applicable rules of
professional responsibility, attorneys should educate clients
about ADR in every case that might include litigation.
Lawyers should help them review their options after learning about their clients’ priorities and values, to avoid inadvertently injecting their own priorities and values into the
decision-making process.9 Ideally, lawyers would provide
clients with detailed and personalized information on how
ADR options would impact them. This suggestion is supported by analogy to medical studies showing that patients
are more knowledgeable and more likely to make decisions
consistent with their preferences, values, and goals when
they use decision aids, such as interactive tools, to help them
make treatment choices.10

8. Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys’ Discussion and Use of ADR,
19 OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. 459, 480-81 (2004). Other barriers to
lawyer-client discussions might be harder to mitigate. For example,
lawyers might be more reluctant to discuss ADR when they overestimate a trial win, or underestimate the chances of early settlement,
or face financial incentives to prolong discovery and head to trial.
Id. at 466-67. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwan, Employing
the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and
Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 831, 846-47 (1998);
Roselle L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study of
the Role of Different Forms of ADR Education and Experience in Attorneys’ ADR Recommendations, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 199, 208
(2002).
9. Donna Shestowsky, Inside the Mind of the Client: An Analysis of Lit-
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CONCLUSION

Many courts, including the ones in this study, provide information about their ADR programs online. However, our results
suggest that offering general education via the Internet is insufficient to ensure litigant awareness of court-sponsored ADR
programs. Moreover, this method of providing information
tends to disadvantage vulnerable populations that are less likely
to have access to the Internet, including low-income individuals, those with disabilities, and the elderly.11 Therefore, courts
should consider playing a more active role in litigant education.
Their efforts should involve requiring lawyers to educate their
clients, but also incorporate practices that do not assume that
lawyers will act as intermediaries. Such changes would benefit
both unrepresented and represented parties.
In addition to implementing changes at the court level, more
needs to be done regarding attorney education. Lawyers should
be able to adequately educate their clients about ADR. Attorneys must have a concrete understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of specific procedures in a variety of contexts so
they can effectively counsel clients, tailoring their advice to
their client’s goals and values. When litigants are adequately
informed about their options and thus can have a meaningful
influence on the trajectory of their dispute’s resolution, courts
should become more efficient and litigants should find the road
to civil justice easier to travel.
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igants' Decision Criteria for Choosing Procedures. CONFLICT RESOL.
Q. 1–19 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21228.
10. Gil Siegal, Richard J. Bonnie & Paul S. Appelbaum, Personalized
Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients’ Needs
in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J. L. MED & ETHICS 359 (2012);
Erica S. Spatz, Harlan M. Krumholz & Benjamin W. Moulton,
Prime Time for Shared Decision Making, 317 (13) JAMA 1309,
1309–1310 (2017).
11. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access:
2000-15, PEW RES. CTR. 2-3 (June 26, 2015),
http://pewinternet.org/files/2015/06/2015-06-26_internet-usageacross-demographics-discover_FINAL.pdf (last accessed Sept. 5,
2018).
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WA N T E D :
A JUDGE WHO WOULD LIKE TO JOIN THE TEAM OF EDITORS
FOR COURT REVIEW, THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION

We are accepting applications to join our editing team. Our plan is generally to have each of the
Court Review editors take responsibility for one issue per year, while also participating in quarterly
conference calls and helping to coordinate content. We hope to add one or two additional judges
to our team starting in January 2019. This is a great way to stay on top of issues of interest to
judges and to help shape the information flow going to other judges throughout the United States
and Canada.
Please send your expression of interest to Editors@courtreview.org. If you have a CV or resume,
please enclose it—and let us know of any experience you have in writing and editing.

Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays,
and book reviews. Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful
information to the working judges of the United States and Canada.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries. About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges. Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, including
municipal court and other specialized court judges. The remainder
include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges, and
administrative-law judges.
Articles: Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes in Microsoft Word format. The suggested article length for
Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text
(including the footnotes). Footnotes should conform to the current
edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation. Articles
should be of a quality consistent with better state-bar-association law
journals and/or other law reviews.
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Essays: Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews: Book reviews should be submitted in the same format as articles. Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of doublespaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will consider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline. In addition to the outline, a comment about the specific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreciated. Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a completed article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts.
Submission: Submissions should be made by email. Please send
them to Editors@CourtReview.org. Submissions will be acknowledged by email. Notice of acceptance, rejection, or requests for
changes will be sent following review.

BRAIN CAPACITY

by Judge Victor Fleming

Across
1 Planning to vote “yea” on
4 Vineyard, in Caen
7 Workers’ safety org.
11 Coolers in cars, briefly
14 Wide of the mark
16 Fort attacked by Goldfinger
17 Do seedy work?
18 Ushers to another row
19 Rib, for one
20 Word after Dead or Red
21 Start of a quotation by John
Wooden
24 Have fewer points than
25 Troublesome tykes
26 French Riviera city
27 Honker
28 Sticky strip
30 More than a scuffle
31 One in 26-Across
32 Clock ticks, for short
33 Entrance feature
35 Part 2 of the quotation
39 Freedom from care
40 Cheeky
41 Sibling of Japheth and Shem
44 Like teardrops
47 ___ Hari
48 Columnist Maureen
49 Maui entertainment
50 Manual reader, say
52 B12 quantities
53 End of the quotation
57 Sister or mother, maybe
58 Not much, but some

59
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Hooch
Philips of comedy
Change the wallpaper, perhaps
4:00 p.m. in London, perhaps
Hosp. workers
Was in a no-win situation?
One who’s sloshed
Soap opera workplace

Down
1 Christmas tree choice
2 Golfer’s cleek
3 Tourist’s stop
4 Swimming stroke
5 “Portnoy’s Complaint” author
6 Bear of the skies
7 “No problem here”
8 Jessica Fletcher, for one
9 Wagner of baseball
10 Jump on ice
11 Attack with vigor
12 Twist one’s arm
13 Al Jolson favorite
15 Violin varnish
22 Slightly sloshed
23 First month, to Felipe
24 Appointment book abbr.
28 Titleist supporters
29 Plot element?
30 Wyo. neighbor
32 Reprieve from the governor, say
33 “Up Where We Belong,” for one
34 Creole vegetable
36 Pre-natal
37 Eye-teasing images

38 Query from one looking at
a family album
42 “Wow!”
43 Hosp. workers
44 Punch souvenir
45 Leaves time?
46 South American treeless
plains
47 Grassy field
48 Start of a warning
50 “That’s ___ nonsense!”
51 Window cover

52 Old gold coin
54 Hog fat
55 Musical based on a T.S.
Eliot book
56 Kitchen spread
60 Permitted

Vic Fleming is a district judge in
Little Rock, Arkansas.
Answers are found on page 140.
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RAYMOND J. MCKOSKI, JUDGES IN STREET
CLOTHES: ACTING ETHICALLY OFF-THEBENCH (Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press, 2017). 265 pp. ($110).
www.fdupress.org.
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct fairly well defines ethical conduct
while on the bench. This heavily footnoted book by retired Judge Raymond
McKoski explores judicial ethics issues in
a myriad of less clear off-the-bench activities. Some examples: Is it permissible for
a judge to be the concession stand cashier
at her child’s basketball game? (pages
178-179, fns. 654-667). Does it violate
the Code to meet with three Rotary Club
members in chambers to discuss where to
hold the Club’s meetings next year?
(page 70, footnotes 127-129). What is
the important difference between using a
courthouse phone to ask my spouse what
groceries to pick up for dinner and using
the same phone to ask what groceries to
pick up for dinner if my law clerk joins
us? (pages 198-200, fns. 783-796).
After 25 years on the Illinois bench,
Judge McKoski (who now is an adjunct
professor at John Marshall Law School)
adds this volume to his law review and
journal publications. Like his other
works, this one is eminently readable.
There are hundreds of examples of ethical conundrums in this well organized,
rule-by-rule exposition of (sometimes
conflicting) appellate cases, disciplinary
decisions, and state and federal ethics
advisory board opinions. A particularly
interesting aspect of the book is how Professor McKoski traces the individual
Rules from the original 1924 ABA
Canons of Judicial Ethics through the
1972, 1990, and 2007 ABA Model Rules
of Judicial conduct. Tracing the changes
and the reasoning behind them is especially valuable in analyzing earlier ethics
opinions, which may no longer apply in
light of a subtly changed Rule.
The constitutional tension between
First Amendment freedoms and govern148 Court Review - Volume 54

ment restrictions on judges’ activities is
addressed all through the book. The early
chapters identify state interests in restricting speech, association, and other off-thebench conduct. The following chapters
consider specific applications of individual rules and the constitutional justification for their limitations on judicial conduct. After immersing the reader in the
details of each Rule and fact-intensive
ethics rulings, the final chapter (pages
201-229, fns. 1-199) contains brave predictions about which Rules likely will
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2018,
National Center for State Courts,
www.ncsc.org/trends.
This annual collection of articles provides a host of ideas and inspiration for
state court judges. The lead article, New
York State’s Opioid Intervention Court
by the Honorable Jane DiFiore, Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
was particularly interesting and timely.
In it, Judge Fiore outlines the process by
which the Buffalo City Court takes
addicts at risk of an overdose who consent to participation out of the jail and
into treatment within 48 hours. In the
first phase of the process, those who
receive outpatient treatment or are
released from inpatient treatment go
through a 12-week stabilization and
intensive monitoring process with daily
testing. During this time, defense counsel and the prosecutor investigate the
case and negotiate. Even if defendants do
not progress to phase two, a drug court
program, they benefit from participating
in treatment and going through withdrawal in a safe, controlled manner. The
program is made possible by an agreement from the District Attorney to suspend prosecution for those undergoing
treatment. Started in May 1, 2017, the
program currently handles 45 to 60 people at a time and is on its way to doubling its original goal of 200 participants
per year. Only one person among the
first 204 participants died from an overdose. The volume also includes a report
from Florida about a new type of problem-solving court focusing on infants

and toddlers and on the court response
to human trafficking, a discussion of
“peacemaking programs,” and a look at
the evolving relationship between state
courts and immigration authorities.

PODCASTS

Ear Hustle, Hosted and Produced by
Nigel Poor and Earlonne Woods,
www.earhustlesq.com.
This podcast, now in its third season, is
hosted by an inmate at San Quentin State
Prison in California, and a Bay Area
visual artist. The voices of the inmates
take the listener inside the prison with
stories that are funny, brutally honest,
and deeply human. This is a beautifully
crafted podcast that has something to
teach judges and anybody else who cares
about our incarcerated citizens.
More Perfect, Hosted by Jad Abumrad
https://www.wnycstudios.org/shows/
radiolabmoreperfect/.
This podcast, a spinoff of the brilliant
RadioLab, offers an in-depth look at the
U.S. Supreme Court, uncovering the stories behind some of the Court’s most
famous decisions and taking a hard—
and, at times, humorous—look at the
way the Court works both internally and
as the highest level of the third branch of
the federal government. It has covered
such topics as Batson (a fascinating tale),
the Court’s surprising early years, the
death penalty, Baker v. Carr, the Commerce Clause, and interruptions during
oral argument.
Criminal, Hosted by Phoebe Judge,
https://thisiscriminal.com.
This podcast considers crime from every
angle—historical, anthropological, sociological, medical—with top-notch writing
and sound design. The stories range from
famous crimes and unsolved mysteries to
the nitty gritty of forensics and how
trauma doctors handle shooting victims.

